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The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the
Freedom of Information Act
A B ST RACT. This Note documents the evolution of the "mosaic theory" in Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) national security law and highlights its centrality in the post-9/11
landscape of information control. After years of doctrinal stasis and practical anonymity, federal
agencies began asserting the theory more aggressively after 9/11, thereby testing the limits of
executive secrecy and of judicial deference. Though essentially valid, the mosaic theory has been
applied in ways that are unfalsifiable, in tension with the text and purpose of FOIA, and
susceptible to abuse and overbreadth. This Note therefore argues, against precedent, for greater
judicial scrutiny of mosaic theory claims.
AUTHOR. J.D., Yale Law School, expected 2007; M.Sc., Oxford University; B.A., Yale
College. Thanks to the Hon. James E. Baker, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Fadi Hanna, Kenneth Levit,
John Sims, David Vladeck, and the Hon. Patricia M. Wald for helpful comments. Meredith
Fuchs introduced me to the mosaic theory and, along with Harold Koh, encouraged me to
undertake this project; their support was invaluable. I owe my deepest debt of gratitude to
Robert Post, who provided generous and incisive guidance every step of the way.
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It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign
intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the
construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger
affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can
be analyzed andfitted into place to reveal with startlingclarity how the unseen
whole must operate.'
[G]ivenjudges' relative lack of expertise regardingnationalsecurity and their
inabilityto see the mosaic, we should not entrust to them the decision whether
an isolatedfact is sensitive enough to warrantclosure.2

INTRODUCTION

The "mosaic theory" describes a basic precept of intelligence gathering:
Disparate items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to
their possessor, can take on added significance when combined with other
items of information. Combining the items illuminates their interrelationships
and breeds analytic synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is
worth more than the sum of its parts. In the context of national security, the
mosaic theory suggests the potential for an adversary to deduce from
independently innocuous. facts a strategic vulnerability, exploitable for
malevolent ends. The Department of the Navy, in its Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) regulations, thus defines the theory as "It]he concept that
apparently harmless pieces of information when assembled together could
reveal a damaging picture." 3 The relevant pieces of information might come
from the government, other public sources, the adversary's own sources, or any
mixture thereof. For several decades, government agencies have invoked
mosaic concerns to justify both classifying documents at higher levels of
confidentiality and withholding documents requested through FOIA or
through pretrial discovery. President Reagan drew attention to the mosaic
theory, and prompted criticism from civil libertarians, by using it to promote
new schemes for safeguarding information, but once he left office the theory
quickly receded from public view.

1. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
2. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3 d Cir.
3.

32 C.F.1.

§ 701.31

2002).

(2oo5). The mosaic theory, as the Navy regulations indicate, is sometimes

referred to as the compilation theory. Id. Both terms have been applied to areas unrelated to
national security; this Note considers only the mosaic theory of intelligence gathering.
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Since the attacks of September 11, 20o, however, the mosaic theory has
made a comeback. If the judicial record is any indication, government agencies
under the Bush Administration have been asserting the mosaic theory with
greater vehemence, across a greater range of records. Courts, in turn, have
grappled with the theory more frequently and more explicitly than ever before.
Facing a post-9/11 national security environment of informational anxiety and
terrorist threat, the Administration has designated FOIA a critical liability and
narrowed its openness-forcing capacity accordingly; the aggrandizement of the
mosaic theory, this Note will demonstrate, has been both a cause and
consequence of the Act's diminishment. Although not all courts have
sanctioned this expanded role for the theory, judges in several high-profile
cases have relied on it to sustain unprecedented acts of secrecy. In Centerfor
National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice,4 for example, the D.C.
Circuit applied the mosaic theory to uphold the Justice Department's
categorical denial of FOIA requests for information about more than seven
hundred people detained in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In North Jersey Media
Group v. Ashcroft,5 the Third Circuit likewise applied the theory to uphold the
government's decision to close 9/11-related "special interest" deportation
hearings to the public and the press. In neither case did the government proffer
substantive evidence of likely harms from disclosure.
Taken along with other recent cases, Centerfor National Security Studies and
North Jersey Media suggest the scope of official activity now being shielded by
the mosaic theory, as well as the degree of judicial deference routinely granted
to agencies making mosaic claims. For courts and agencies alike, since 9/11 the
mosaic theory has at the same time manifested, justified, and exacerbated a
new reticence to publicize government-controlled information. In the process,
the theory has insinuated itself into the findamental post-9/11 debates: how to
balance civil liberties with national security and how to structure intelligence
policy in an age of terrorism. Despite scant attention from the media or from
scholars, 6 the mosaic theory has developed into a doctrinal tool of great force in
national security law.

4.

331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).

s.

308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.

6.

While the mosaic theory has been discussed in the context of specific cases or executive
actions, it has never been taken as an independent subject, in law or any other discipline,
and I have discovered only one other argument for the theory as a theme in post-9/ui
national security litigation beyond immigration proceedings. See Panel Discussion,
American Constitution Society Conference, The United States, Human Rights, and
International Law (Aug. 1, 2003), http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/Human%2oRights.pdf
(statement of Patricia Wald, Former Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit)
("The government uses a kind of familiar argument ...running through most of the 9/11

1o56 (2003).
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This Note, the first work to analyze the mosaic theory in systematic (or
even sustained) fashion, attempts to document this development and assess its
implications. In synthesizing the case history, I consider several interrelated
areas of national security information law, but I focus on FOIA, where the
mosaic theory has had greatest effect, and on the courts, where the theory's
boundaries are ultimately delimited. In particular, I examine the difficulties the
theory poses for courts hearing national security cases. New terrorists and new
technologies have increased the risks from mosaic-making in recent years, and
the trauma of 9/11 has increased the salience of such risks. Yet while the mosaic
theory provides an accurate description of how adversaries might capitalize on
information disclosure, courts have-in deference to agencies' perceived
superiority at evaluating mosaic threats-applied it in ways that are
unfalsifiable and deeply susceptible to abuse and overbreadth; they have
created in the mosaic theory a latently subversive basis for withholding
information. When courts accord heightened deference to agencies' mosaic
claims, moreover, they contravene the text and purpose of FOIA. As a result, I
argue that mosaic claims deserve additional judicial scrutiny, not additional
deference.

cases; the so-called mosaic theory."). Commentators have recognized the theory as an
important and vexing issue in national security law, but none has ventured an analysis of
mosaic theory history or doctrine. The most prominent critical references include DAVID
COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON

TERRORISM 20-21, 32-33 (2003) (assailing the Bush Administration's use of the theory in
post-9/11 immigration proceedings); Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and
Constitutional Consequences of Post-9 /11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United
States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 6o9, 652 (2005)
(same); Robert P. Deyling, JudicialDeference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National
Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 Viii. L. REV. 67, 84 (1992)
(calling the theory "[o]ne of the most serious challenges to effective judicial scrutiny of
executive claims"); Janet Raloff, Coming: The Big Chill?, in FREEDOM AT RISK: SECRECY,
CENSORSHIP, AND REPRESSION INTHE 198OS, at 86, 89-9o (Richard 0. Curry ed., 1988)
(summarizing the theory's application in the Reagan Administration); Jonathan Turley,
Through a Looking Glass Darkly: NationalSecurity and Statutory Interpretation,53 SMU L. REV.
205, 232 (2000) ("What made the Area Si litigation a fascinating academic model was... the
additional use of the highly controversial 'mosaic theory' to effectively defeat any
enforcement of the statutory provisions."); Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still a "Sound
Legal Basis?": The Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 1605,
1641-42 (2003) (questioning the court's application of the theory in Center for National
Security Studies); Rashad Hussain, Policy Comment, Security with Transparency: Judicial
Review in "Special Interest" Immigration Proceedings, 113 YALE L.J. 1333, 1335 & n.12 (2004)
(same for North Jersey Media); and Steven J. Lepper, Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1 9 82, 1983 DUKE L.J. 390, 397-98 & n.56 (arguing that the theory gives
FOIA an unlegislated tenth exemption).
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The Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of FOIA's
relationship to national security and traces the mosaic theory's trajectory in
national security information law from its advent in 1972 through September
11, 2001. Part II discusses the recent transformation of FOIA and the mosaic
theory. Evaluating the major post-9/11 cases, I argue that the Bush
Administration's bolder use of the theory has unsettled mosaic theory
jurisprudence. At issue in this emerging doctrinal division is the extent to
which the Administration's War on terror will be insulated from judicial
scrutiny, as well as the future of FOIA's national security exemption. Moving
from positive to normative examination of judicial review of mosaic cases, Part
III challenges the longstanding assumption that these cases make up a special
class of FOIA appeal and critiques the delegatory tradition in mosaic theory
review. A concluding Section sketches proposals for invigorating judicial
oversight without endangering national security.
I.

THE MOSAIC THEORY IN FOIA LAW, 1972-2001

The mosaic theory is, essentially, a theory of informational synergy. It
describes a process through which adversaries collect, combine, and compile
items of information, some or even all of which are harmless in their own right.
And it suggests an outcome whereby this process, in a feat of analytic alchemy,
converts the harmless information into something useful. "[A]ll intelligence
agencies," one FOIA opinion recently noted, "collect seemingly disparate pieces
7
of information [in the hope of] assembl[ing] them into a coherent picture.
That is, they all make mosaics, constantly. It would be illogical, therefore, to
make classification decisions on an item-by-item basis; instead, "[p]rotection
through classification is required if the combination of unclassified items of
information provides an added factor that warrants protection of the
information taken as a whole."8 To determine the security risk of disclosing a
given document, the mosaic theory stipulates, one must consider the possible
mosaics to which the document might contribute. The mosaic, not the
document, becomes the appropriate unit of risk assessment.
In the decades that courts have applied it to national security information
law, this Part will show, the mosaic theory has hardly evolved past this sketch.
Several early opinions set out a framework for the theory and a framework for
applying it. For these courts, and for those that followed, the theory appeared

7.

8.

Berman v. CIA, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1215 (E.D. Cal.

2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434, 436 (D. Nev. 1995) (summarizing Information Security
Oversight Office guidelines).
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to make risk assessment more complicated-and hence to make judicial
deference to government agencies more apposite. Beyond these principles, the
mosaic theory has not been undertheorized in the case law or its derivative
literature so much as it has not been theorized at all.
To elucidate the theory's development, this Part begins with an explanatory
note on FOIA. 9 Although the text and legislative history of the Act contemplate
judicial deference to federal agencies, as Section A explains, Congress aimed to
circumscribe this deference through a number of mechanisms. Nevertheless,
the history of FOIA national security adjudication makes plain that structural
and psychological biases give the government a great advantage, in mosaic and
non-mosaic cases alike. Sections B and C describe how, after a triad of early
opinions established the conceptual and rhetorical core of mosaic theory
doctrine, it steadily gained acceptance in other courts throughout the 198os
and 199os. Without ever specifying what constitutes a mosaic theory case or
why such a case demands special treatment, these courts consistently accorded
heightened deference to agencies' mosaic arguments. Agencies were allowed to
withhold information on the basis of mosaics that judges rarely, if ever,
interrogated in detail, challenged as implausible, or attempted to segregate into
harmful and nonharmful components. Most judges consigned the mosaic
theory to the realm of metaphor. Even before 9/11, then, the mosaic theory had
achieved a privileged status under FOIA, whereby courts accorded its
government proponents especially lenient treatment.
A. FOIA and NationalSecurity: A BriefOverview
1. The Framework ofFOIA
Replacing the ineffectual public disclosure section of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946, FOIA was the first federal statute to establish an
enforceable right of public access to executive branch information." The
"crystal clear... congressional objective" in promulgating FOIA, proclaimed
the Supreme Court, was "to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny."" Pursuant to FOIA, the

9. The origins and workings of FOIA, and the controversies surrounding it, have been treated
extensively elsewhere. See, e.g.,

HERBERT

N. FOERSTEL,

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE

RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
(1999); OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
GUIDE &PRivACY ACT OVERVIEW (2004) [hereinafter DOJ FOIA GUIDE].
1o.

Pub L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).

11. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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government has disclosed millions of documents to requesters and proactively
released millions more to the general public through the Federal Register,
reading rooms, and websites. The Act has become both a powerful tool for
inducing disclosure and a powerful symbol of America's commitment to
governmental transparency.
Yet from the beginning, FOIA has been marked by compromise, as its
underlying principles of openness and accountability often conflict with other
societal goals, "such as the public's interests in the effective and efficient
operations of government... and in the preservation of the confidentiality of
sensitive personal, commercial, and governmental information."' 2 To negotiate
the countervailing interests opposing its "general philosophy of full agency
disclosure,"' 3 FOIA provides for nine exemptions under which agencies can
withhold requested information. 4 For national security, the most significant
are Exemption 1, which allows agencies to withhold records in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy, and Exemption 3, which allows agencies to
withhold records that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
Exemption 1 is the national security exemption;"5 Exemption 3 implicates
national security because several withholding statutes -particularly the
National Security Act and the Central Intelligence Agency Act -authorize the
CIA, the FBI, the Department of Defense, and other agencies to protect large
swaths of national-security-related records. 6 Defense and intelligence agencies
have been among the most vocal critics of FOIA' 7 and have typically had the
lowest disclosure rates.s
The current framework for administering national security exemptions
came into being with FOIA's first set of amendments, 9 which substantially
limited agencies' ability to withhold documents for national security reasons.

12.

DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 5.

13.

S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965).

14.

5 U.S.C.

§ 5 52(b)(1)-(9)

(2000).

iS. See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20,
is FOIA's national security exemption.").

27

(D.D.C. 2003) ("Exemption 1

16.

See DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 247-49.

17.

See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved ConstitutionalProblems, 49 U. PITr. L. REv. 753, 761
(1988) ("[M]ost of [the security agencies] do not like the FOIA one whit .... ").
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Freedom of Information Act: Annual FOIA Reports,
http://www.usdoj.gov/o4foia/o4_6.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2005) (reporting agencies'
disclosure performance for fiscal years 1998 through 2004). For each of the past seven years,
the CIA and the FBI have had among the lowest-and usually the lowest-ratios for any
federal agency of FOIA requests granted to requests processed or answered.

18.

ig.

Act of Nov.

21,

1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.

(2000)).
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Overriding a presidential veto, Congress passed the 1974 amendments with the
2
express purpose of overruling the Supreme Court's holding in EPA v. Mink 1
that courts should not review the substantive propriety of agencies'
classification decisions. 21 Seeking to empower courts to rectify "the widespread
abuses raging under the existing classification process,"' Congress changed
Exemption 1 from exempting all matters "specifically required by Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy" 3
to exempting only those matters that "are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order."4 Congress further narrowed Exemption 1, and all other
exemptions, by inserting into FOIA a "segregation" provision requiring that
"[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any
person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are
exempt."2 51 That is, Congress displaced "records" as the relevant unit of analysis
under the Act: Agencies invoking exemptions would now have to look within
records so as to excise only the minimal amount necessary. To facilitate
meaningful judicial oversight, Congress authorized courts to review FOIA
appeals de novo and inspect documents in camera, and placed the burden on
agencies to sustain all withholding actions.26
2.

JudicialReview in FOIA National Security Cases

After exhausting administrative remedies, a dissatisfied FOIA requester
may contest agency decisions in federal district court. 7 In light of the

20.

410 U.S. 73 (1973).

21.

S. REP. No.

93-120o,

at

11-12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP.

No. 93-138o, at

12 (1974)

(Conf. Rep.).
CONG. REc. 17,019 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).

22.

120

23.

FOIA, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 8o Stat. 250,

z.

Act of Nov.

25.
26.

27.

251

(1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 5

55 2(b)(1)

(1970)).

1974, § 2(a) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §

5 52(b)(1)(B) (2ooo)). Rooted
textually to these executive orders' definitions of national security, Exemption i has no
21,

meaning independent of them. The prevailing executive order establishes what types of
information agencies will seek to exempt from FOIA, what processes they will follow and
what standards they will apply in so doing, and for how long.
Id. § 2(c) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000)).
Id. 5 1(b)(2) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), 552(b) (2000)). Judges have broad
discretion over whether and how to conduct in camera review, see Spirko v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 147 F. 3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1998), which is often employed in national security cases
because it allows for confidentiality, DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 8Ol.
Because FOIA confers (nonexclusive) jurisdiction over all appeals on the D.C. District
Court, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2ooo), that court hears far more FOLA appeals than any
other. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2003 Calendar Year Report on Department of Justice
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Executive's "unique insights into what adverse effects might occur as a result of
public disclosure," Congress indicated in drafting the 1974 amendments that
courts in national security cases should "accord substantial weight to an
agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed
record. "2 To fulfill their intended review role, however, courts strive to accord
this weight "without relinquishing their independent responsibility"'2 9 judicial "deference is not equivalent to acquiescence,"3" and "conclusory and
generalized allegations of exemptions" are not acceptable bases for
withholding.3 Moreover, Exemption 1, like all the exemptions, must be
narrowly construed.32 Nevertheless, the standard for withholding records on
national security grounds remains accommodating, as courts test agencies'
national security claims only for reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and
plausibility.33 They do not typically assess whether the alleged risks of
disclosure would be likely to materialize, or weigh those risks against other
interests.
This truncated judicial review comports, of course, with courts' broad
tendency to defer to the political branches in matters of national security. Such
deference reflects constitutional and statutory constraints on the judiciary as
well as self-imposed prudential considerations, but in FOIA cases the
prudential considerations predominate, for the Act explicitly enables courts to
review appeals de novo and to order the production of improperly withheld
documents. Courts defer to the Executive because they believe judges "lack
the expertise necessary to second-guess . .. agency opinions in the typical
national security FOIA case."3" Compounding this deference, the government
has the advantage in FOLA appeals of controlling both the disputed
information and-through Exemption i's reliance on executive orders-the
definition of national security. The result is that the government almost always

Freedom of Information Act Litigation Activities: Decisions Rendered in 2003,
http://www.usdoj.gov/o4foia/o3decisions.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2005). The D.C.
Circuit, consequently, has assumed unique significance for FOIA jurisprudence.
28. S. REP. No. 93-120o, at 12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).

Goldberg v. U.S. Dep't of State, 8M8 F.2d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
30. Campbell v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 164 F. 3d 20, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
31. Vaughn v. Rosen, 4 84 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
29.

32.

Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).

33. Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 11oo, 11o5 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
3S. Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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wins in FOIA national security litigation. 6 In only one Exemption 1 case has a
court found agency bad faith, and that decision was vacated on appeal.37 The
CIA, which derivatively classifies more documents than any other government
body,"' has proven especially invulnerable to FOLA review: The Ninth Circuit
conceded in 1992 that "we are now only a short step away [from] exempting all
CIA records from FOIA."3 ' As the following Section will show, the mosaic
theory had already emerged by the end of the 1970s as a powerful withholding
tool for the CIA. Other agencies would soon follow.
B. 1972-198o: Marchetti, Halkin, and Halperin

Although the mosaic theory of intelligence gathering had existed in the
national security community for some time, 40 its first-and still seminalexposition in U.S. law came from Chief Judge Clement Haynsworth in the
1972 Fourth Circuit case United States v. Marchetti.4 Not a FOIA case, Marchetti
featured a government action to enjoin a former CIA employee from
publishing an expos6 of the agency entitled The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.
Drawing on an executive right to secrecy under Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,4 2 the court
upheld Marchetti's secrecy agreement with the CIA and found for the
government. That much was predictable; more interesting was the prudential
justification given by the court to reinforce its constitutional arguments:

36. See Deyling, supra note 6, at 67; Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the Strymasters Accountable After

37.
38.

9/11: A Proposed Model for CIA Disclosure Requirements Under the Freedom of Information Act,
27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 79, 131-32 (2004); cf. Wald, supra note 17, at 760
(remarking, while Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, that de novo review in FOIA national
security cases "often seems to be done in a perfunctory way").
See DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 150-51.
INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2003, at 18 (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2oo3rpt.pdf (reporting classification activity for fiscal year
2003).

39. Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40.

Raloff, supra note 6, at 89. The theory was also recognized abroad: In a celebrated 1966
case, the German government asserted a mosaic theory of treason against the publishers of
Der Spiegel magazine. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 397-402 (1989); Herbert Bernstein, Comment, West
Germany: Free Press and National Security: Reflections on the Spiegel Case, 15 AM. J. CoMP. L.
547, 557 (1967).

41.

466 F.2d 1309 ( 4 th Cir.

42.

299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

1 _-

1972).
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There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial review of secrecy
classifications. The significance of one item of information may
frequently depend upon knowledge of many other items of
information. What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of
great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put
the questioned item of information in its proper context. The courts, of
course, are ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign
intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy
classifications in that area.43
Without labeling it as such, the Fourth Circuit grounded its practical argument
for judicial restraint in the mosaic theory. Even if judges possess the ability to
evaluate individual items of national security information, the court reasoned,
they lack the "broad view" with which to contextualize these items and thereby
glean their true significance. Consequently, judges should not only defer to
agency expertise; they should avoid review altogether. The mosaic theory, as
applied here in a related context, helps vindicate the pre-1974 model of FOIA,
wherein courts hearing national security cases effectively abdicated disclosure
decisions to agencies, rendering the Act-in then-Professor Antonin Scalia's
words -"a relatively toothless beast.""
After several years of dormancy, Marchetti's thread entered FOIA
jurisprudence at the end of the decade through the D.C. Circuit, which
extended Marchetti's mosaic theory analysis in Halkin v. Helms 4s and Halperin
v. C!A. 46 In Halkin, the D.C. Circuit upheld the government's use of the state
secrets privilege to deny former Vietnam War protesters' discovery request for
information on whether their international communications had been
intercepted by the National Security Agency (NSA) and disseminated to other
federal agencies. Noting that state secrets cases and FOIA Exemption i cases
are "analogous,"4 7 the court, citing Marchetti, likewise situated its deference in
the mosaic theory. 4s In so doing, Halkin invoked the mosaic metaphor in

43. 466 F.2d at 1318.
44. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of InformationAct Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982,
at 14, 15.

598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
46. 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 198o).
47. 598 F.2d at 9.
48. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. In the subsequent civil suit, the D.C. Circuit
reiterated the mosaic metaphor quoted in this Note's epigraph in upholding again the
government's use of the state secrets privilege. Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 993 n.57
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
45.
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national security law for the first time, and, importantly, linked it to modern
computer technology. Even in 1978, the potential for computers to increase
exponentially their users' ability to process and find patterns in informationto make mosaics -was clear. Unlike in Marchetti, the jurists in Halkin tried to
ascertain the mosaic-based risks of disclosure before finding for the
government. They did so only at a highly general level, however, concluding
without qualification that "[d] isclosure of the identities of senders or recipients
of acquired messages would enable foreign governments or organizations to
49
extrapolate the focus and concerns of our nation's intelligence agencies."
In a separate statement explaining why he voted (unsuccessfully) for a
rehearing en banc, Judge David Bazelon disputed the need for secrecy
regarding the NSA intercepts and characterized the court's "utmost deference"
to the government as violating the legislative intent of the 1974 FOIA
amendments."0 According to Bazelon, "the panel could have reached its
decision only by taking the government's ex parte affidavits at face value and
refusing to assess their credibility in light of reason and the information already
made public, the minimal elements of de novo review.""1 By casting the majority
holding as the "willing suspension of disbelief," 2 Bazelon implied that its
mosaic discussion had been a sham-the majority had substituted rhetoric for
analysis, an epigram for sensitive, individualized document review. Applied in
this way, Bazelon foreshadowed, the mosaic theory could justify virtually any
withholding.
Two years later in Halperin, the D.C. Circuit expressly introduced the
mosaic theory to FOIA to affirm, under Exemptions 1 and 3, the CIA's
withholding of documents detailing its legal arrangements with private
attorneys. After conceding that the disclosure of the CIA's legal fees, without
more, would not present obvious national security risks, the court cautioned:
We must take into account, however, that each individual piece of
intelligence information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in
piecing together other bits of information even when the individual
piece is not of obvious importance in itself. When combined with other
small leads, the amount of a legal fee could well prove useful for
53
identifying a covert transaction.

49.

598 F.2d at 8.

50.

Id. at 14-18 (Bazelon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

51. Id. at 17.
52.

Id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).

53.

Halperin v. CIA,

A-

629 F.2d

144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 198o).
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Fleshing out its mosaic metaphor with a jigsaw puzzle metaphor, the court
rested its entire holding on the mosaic theory without ever discussing how a
legal fee could be combined with "other small leads," whatever these might be,
to create a national security risk. The mosaic scenario posited here was even
vaguer than the scenario contemplated in Halkin, yet the D.C. Circuit seemed
even more reluctant to scrutinize it. While Halperin was not an important
FOIA case in a direct sense-public interest in the CIA's legal expenses being
relatively tepid-it signaled the emergence of the mosaic theory as a potent
argument for agencies seeking to withhold information.
Taken together, then, Marchetti, Halkin, and Halperin, in introducing the
mosaic theory to national security law, use it to bolster judicial deference on
two levels: They present the theory as a general reason for courts to fear
disclosure and mistrust their own judgment; and they treat mosaic arguments
as a unique rationale for nondisclosure, with lower requirements for specificity
and support. The opinions' bracing rhetoric, moreover, tints the theory with an
element of mystery and malice. This logic and language continue to undergird
mosaic theory jurisprudence, as essentially every subsequent opinion applying
the theory has cited Marchetti, Halkin, and/or Halperin as key precedent, often
excerpting the passages quoted above.
C. 1981-2001: Statutory Recognition,JudicialDeference
The next important development in mosaic theory doctrine came from an
extrajudicial source: President Reagan's Executive Order 12,356, which in 1982
wrote the theory into law. The source of classification standards for FOIA's
Exemption 1, Reagan's Order stated that "[i]nformation that is determined to
concern one or more of the [classification] categories . .. shall be classified
when an original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized
disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could
be expected to cause damage to the national security." 4 Under this language,
government classifiers were charged with conceptualizing the dangers of
disclosure in mosaic theory terms, and FOIA courts bound to uphold such an
approach. By contrast, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter had been silent
about the mosaic theory in their analogous executive orders,"5 while Presidents
Truman and Eisenhower had positively rejected it, decreeing: "Documents

54.

Exec. Order No.

12,356, § 1.3(b),

3 C.F.R. 166, 169

(1982)

(emphasis added), reprintedin 50

U.S.C. § 401 (1982).

55.

Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973) (Nixon), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. S 401 (Supp. V
1975); Exec. Order No. 11,862, 3A C.F.R. 166 (1975) (Ford); Exec. Order No. 12,o65, 3
C.F.R. 190 (1978) (Carter), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1981).
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shall be classified according to their own content
and not necessarily according
6
to their relationship to other documents."5
Wary of KGB agents exploiting powerful new database technologies,
President Reagan expressed alarm at the mosaic theory's implications
throughout his term in office.' Although small pieces of unclassified data
might be innocuous in isolation, he feared they would "reveal highly classified
and other sensitive information when taken in aggregate."58 In response,
Reagan launched a campaign, ultimately abandoned in the face of widespread
criticism, to safeguard unclassified data in private databases and to limit
foreigners' access to public databases.5 9 In a Reagan Administration they
already considered excessively secretive, some civil libertarians saw totalitarian
undertones in this use of the theory. As Democratic Congressman Glenn
English reportedly remarked, "[c]arried out to its logical conclusion, the
mosaic theory justifies the withholding of all information, no matter how
innocuous. ,,6,
Hence, having written the mosaic theory into classification law, Reagan
went further and pushed it into the public consciousness- but only for a brief
while. After he left office, executive branch officials almost never spoke out on
the mosaic theory, and the critical commentary quickly dried up.6 1 Though

56. Exec. Order No.

10,290, § 26.d, 3 C.F.R. 789, 794 (1949-1953) (Truman), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. S 401 (Supp. V 1952); Exec. Order No. lo,5o1, S 3(a), 3 C.F.R 979, 980 (1949-1953)

(Eisenhower), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
Mary Mclver & William Lowther, Tapping New Secrets, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 28, 1987, at 6o,
60; see also Brock N. Meeks, Uncovering the Secret History of the Cold War: The National
Security Archive Beats the White House, WIRED, Dec. 1993, at 48, 52 (discussing the Reagan
Justice Department's fear that the work of the National Security Archive, a repository for
declassified government documents, would "nurture the Mosaic Theory, wherein KGB
agents would be able to piece together US government secrets").
58. National Security Decision Directive 145: National Policy on Telecommunications and
57.

Automated

Information

Systems

Security

(Sept.

17,

1984),

available

at

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsddx45.htm.
See id.; Raloff, supra note 6, at 89-90; Mclver & Lowther, supra note 57, at 6o-61.
60. See Mclver & Lowther, supra note 57, at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Lepper,
supra note 6, at 396 n.49 ("The prevailing fear [regarding Reagan's codification of the
mosaic theory in Executive Order 12,356] is that the 'mosaic theory' alone provides sufficient
incentive for overclassification."); George Lardner Jr., Secrecy System Pronounced Sound,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1988, at A25 ("'As a result of this "mosaic theory,"' [Harvard Vice
President John] Shattuck said, 'we have an evolving system of scientific and technical
censorship in this country.'").
61. A LexisNexis search on "mosaic theory" in the Major Newspapers database, for example,
yields only three articles written in the 199os (the second of which is a reprisal of the first)
that use the term in the intelligence-gathering sense. The same search in the Magazine
Stories, Combined database yields only one article.
5g.
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abortive, Reagan's database campaign illuminates several important
characteristics of the mosaic theory: its conceptual applicability beyond the
classification process, its potential threat to civil liberties, and its dynamic
relationship with information technology. When the Bush Administration
resurrected the Reaganite approach to the mosaic theory after 9/11, all of these
characteristics would once again manifest themselves.62
A few years after Reagan's executive order, the mosaic theory first (and
last) reached the Supreme Court in CIA v. Sims,3 a 1985 case concerning
FOIA's Exemption 3. The CIA had denied the plaintiffs' request for
information regarding a CIA-financed research project, code-named
MKULTRA, established in 1953 to counter Soviet and Chinese advances in
64
brainwashing and interrogation techniques. Echoing the government's brief,
the Court cited Halperin, Halkin, and Marchetti in quick succession in
concluding that "the Director [of Central Intelligence] . . . has power to
withhold superficially innocuous information on the ground that it might
enable an observer to discover [through mosaic-making] the identity of an
intelligence source. ''t1 The Court reasoned that the Director "must of course be
familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges are not," and so his decisions "are
worthy of great deference." 66 Without qualifying this institutional selfdeprecation or considering possible drawbacks to such "great deference," Sims
vigorously endorsed the mosaic theory as a cause for judicial restraint and
consolidated Halperin, Halkin, and Marchetti as its leading cases. Since Sims,
the CIA has enjoyed virtually "carte blanche" immunity from FOIA. 6 z Even
though the case dealt with the CIA's enumerated powers under the National
Security Act, lower courts have applied Sims's mosaic-theory-based deference
arguments more broadly, to other agencies and other exemptions. 68
Throughout the 198os and 199os, the mosaic theory flourished in FOIA
national security case law as a justification for classification and narrow judicial
review. Outside of the D.C. federal courts, where the theory quickly took hold,

6z. See infra Part II.
63.

471 U.S. 159 (1985).

64. Brief for the Respondents at 7, CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (No. 83-1249).
65. 471 U.S. at 178.
66. Id. at 179.
67. Halstuk, supra note 36, at 102, 112-17.
68. Recent examples include Centerfor National Security Studies v. U.S. Department ofjustice, 331

F. 3d 918, 927-28 (D.C. Cir. 2003), in which the court deferred to the Department of Justice
under Exemption 7, and Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47 (D.D.C. 2003), in which the
court deferred to the FBI under Exemption i. These cases are discussed infra Subsection
II.D.i and note 133, respectively.
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the mosaic theory helped support judgments in favor of withholding agencies
in FOIA national security opinions by, in chronological order, the District
Court for the Northern District of New York, 6, the Sixth Circuit, 70 the Third
Circuit,7 1 the District Court for the Southern District of New York,72 the Fifth
Circuit,73 and the Ninth Circuit.74 In none of these cases did the court evaluate
the agency's mosaic claims in any detail, address counterarguments, or
acknowledge tensions between its application of the theory and FOIA. Such
mosaic-theory-based deference assumed a steadily more significant, though
low-profile role in FOIA jurisprudence as precedent accrued and as technology
rendered "intelligence gathering... more highly sophisticated" and assessing
7' 5
the risks of disclosure "increasingly complicated.
Only one case in this period suggested limits to the mosaic theory. In the
1987 case Muniz v. Meese, 76 the D.C. District Court became the first court to
reject an agency's mosaic argument outright. Muniz was a Title VII case in
which Hispanic special agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) alleged
discriminatory practices, and the government sought to block discovery of the
DEA's employment records. The government argued, alongside two other
primary defenses, that "anyone possessing the employment histories of DEA
agents could piece together a mosaic of the agency's worldwide structure,
capabilities, and enforcement activities."' Dismissing this argument in a
footnote, the court found noncredible the assertion "that information as to
when particular Hispanic agents were promoted in relation to their nonHispanic counterparts would provide anyone with the ability" to make such a
mosaic. r8 The D.C. District Court upset no mosaic theory doctrine with this
holding, however, and no subsequent courts (or scholars) have ever cited
Muniz;79 the mosaic postulated by the DEA was too remote from the national

69.

Daily Orange Corp. v. CIA, 532 F. Supp.

70.

Ingle v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 268 (6th Cir. 1983).
Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 831 F.2d 441,445-46 (3 d Cir. 1987).
Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights v. INS, 721 F. Supp. 552, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1989).

71.
72.

73.

122, 126

(N.D.N.Y.

1982).

75.

Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1118-20 (9 th Cir. 1992).
In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

76.

115 F.RtD. 63 (D.D.C. 1987).

T7.

Id. at 65.
Id. at 65 n.7.
This does not include two subsequent cases directly related to Muniz. See Muniz v. Meese,
122 F.R.D. 1, 1-2 (D.D.C. 1988); Gallegos v. Thornburgh, Civ. A. No. 88-1869, 1989 WL
2o6495, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 1989).

14.

78.
79.
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security mainstream to attract notice and too baldly pretextual to be taken
seriously.
Outside of the courts, the most significant development in mosaic theory
law between Sims and 9/11 was President Clinton's Executive Order 12,958.

Superseding Executive Order 12,356, Clinton struck Reagan's mosaic theory
clause and replaced it with section 1.8(e): "Compilations of items of
information which are individually unclassified may be classified if the
compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that: (1)
meets the standards for classification under this order; and (2) is not otherwise
revealed in the individual items of information. " 8' Drawing on the "added
factor" test of an earlier case," this provision limits the contextual inquiry to
preexisting, aggregated, government-controlled information, and it demands
the revelation, not just the reasonable expectation, of an additional association
or relationship meriting classification. It is therefore a "somewhat more
restrictive form" of the mosaic theory, as the Department of Justice (DOJ)
remarked at the time.82 Yet whatever section 1.8(e)'s intended or implied
differences from Reagan's provision, courts hearing FOIA appeals seemed
unmoved by the new language.8 3 Mosaic theory doctrine, largely developed by
courts before any executive order had mentioned the theory, had hardened by
1995, and the Clinton Administration did little to promote section 1.8(e) as an
alternative methodology.
II.

THE MOSAIC THEORY AFTER 9/11

As outlined above, the mosaic theory has supported heightened executive
branch protection of national security information, and heightened judicial
deference to that protection, for over thirty years. Except for one period in the
Reagan Administration, the theory provoked little debate or even attention
because agencies used it in isolated instances, its doctrinal foundations
remained stable, and its basic premise makes sense. As the Bush
Administration has increased secrecy and narrowed FOIA in the prosecution of

go.

Exec. Order No. 12,958,
(Supp. II 1996).

81.

Taylor v. Dep't of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

8z.

S i.8(e), 3 C.F.R. 333, 339-40 (1995), reprinted in 5o

U.S.C. § 435

OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE

AND PRivACACT OVERVIEW 74 (1996).

83. E.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F. 3 d 1159, 1166 (9 th Cir. 1998); J. Roderick MacArthur Found.
v. FBI, 102 F.3d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Billington v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, ii F. Supp.
2d 45, 5S (D.D.C. 1998). No published opinion has remarked on section i.8(e) as requiring
different analysis, or reevaluated mosaic theory precedent in light of it.

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

115:628

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

2005

its War on terror, however, the mosaic theory has taken on a new prominence.
In the rush to classify and safeguard information, including a new category of
"sensitive but unclassified information," federal agencies have used the mosaic
theory more aggressively than in the past.8s At the same time, in denying FOIA
and document-discovery requests, the government has increasingly relied on
the mosaic theory in court to conceal its actions. The theory has therefore
supported both more secrecy in the government's management of information
and more secrecy about that secrecy by foreclosing scrutiny ex post. Reflecting
both the gravity of today's terrorist threats and the Administration's zeal for
secrecy in countering those threats, this expansion of the theory -in usage, not
in concept-has forced judges to confront mosaic claims more explicitly,
exposing deep divisions in how courts evaluate executive action in an age of
terrorism.
This Part analyzes the recent decisions that have grappled with mosaic
arguments in light of the changing role of information in national security
strategy. After Section A summarizes the erosion of FOIA since 9/11, Section B
explains how the attacks sensitized policymakers to the ways in which
terrorism and technology have been increasing the scope of mosaic threats
while decreasing their predictability. Section C follows these developments to
the courts. I suggest that the theory has not only played a decisive role in the
post-9/11 jurisprudence of information control, but also a divisive role, with
standard "deference" and "abdication" emerging as challenges to the
heightened deference (the "delegation") courts have traditionally applied in
mosaic cases. Section D concretizes these ruptures in mosaic theory doctrine
with profiles of the two most controversial post-9/11 mosaic cases.
A. The NarrowingofFOIA
Although the Bush Administration exhibited a penchant for secrecy from
the beginning, 81 it made no public alterations to FOIA prior to 9/11. As part of
its dramatic expansion of government secrecy since the attacks, however, the
Administration has undermined FOIA on a host of levels, most directly
through Executive Order 13,292.86 Issued by President Bush in March 2003,

84.

of course, it is impossible to know exactly how much government classifiers and attorneys
(in classified submissions) have relied on the mosaic theory. While it seems likely that such
nonpublic usages of the theory have also proliferated, my arguments here reflect only the
public record.

85.

See Anderson, supra note 6, at 162o n.74; Josh Chafetz, The White House Hides History, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27 & Sept. 3, 2001, at 20.

86.

Exec. Order No.

A A

13,292,

3 C.F.R. 196 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 (West 2005).
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this Order rescinds many of President Clinton's liberal innovations to the
Reagan classification order. Order 13,292 reintroduces a presumption of harm
to national security from the release of information provided by or related to
foreign governments;17 it drops the Clinton restrictions on the duration of
classifications and the ability to classify information over twenty-five years
old;8 8 and it permits once again the reclassification of previously declassified
information. s
An October 2001 memorandum on FOIA policy from Attorney General
John Ashcroft to all federal agency heads,9 meanwhile, rescinded his
predecessor's "presumption of disclosure" for all FOIA requests. 91 In 1993,
Janet Reno had announced that the DOJ would "defend the assertion of a
FOIA exemption only in those cases where the agency reasonably foresees that
disclosure would be harmful to an interest protected by that exemption."9 2
Ashcroft, by contrast, advised withholding agencies, "you can be assured that
the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound
legal basis" 93 -an even more antidisclosure standard than the Reagan DOJ's
"substantial legal basis" test. 94 Supplementing Ashcroft's communique, a
March 2002 memorandum from Laura Kimberly, Acting Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), instructed agencies to take
"appropriate actions to safeguard sensitive but unclassified information related
to America's homeland security... by giving full and careful consideration to

87.

Id. 5 1.1(c).

1.6,
1 3.4, 3 C.F.R. 333, 337-38, 343-45 (1995), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.
88. Exec. Order No. 12,958,
§ 435 (Supp. I 1996).
8g. Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435
(West 2005). Given these substantive differences between Bush's Order and Clinton's Order
12,958 which it supersedes, there is a distinctly Orwellian tincture to the latest DOJ FOIA
guide's insistence on referring to the Bush Order as "Executive Order 12,958, as amended"
rather than simply "Executive Order 13,292." DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, passim.
go. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to the Heads of All Federal
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2OO), availableat http://www.doi.gov/foia/foia.pdf.
91. Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to the Heads of Departments and
Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiaupdates/
VolXI Jpage3.htm.
92. Id.
93- Memorandum from Attorney General Ashcroft to the Heads of All Federal Departments and
Agencies, supra note 90.
94- Christopher M. Mason, Comment, Developments Under the Freedom ofInformation Act-1981,

DuKE L.J. 423, 425 (citing Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to All
Federal Departments and Agencies (May 5,1981)).
1982
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all applicable FOIA exemptions. '9 5 Kimberly's memorandum never defines
"sensitive but unclassified information," which some have estimated to
subsume nearly seventy-five percent of all government-held information. 96
In response to the 9/11 attacks and the Ashcroft and Kimberly memoranda,
federal agencies have removed thousands of documents from their websites
and classified millions more. Since the Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1996, 97 agencies had increasingly been publicizing their
records on the Internet, but in the wake of 9/11, as President Clinton's Chief of
Staff has observed, "[t]he breadth and the scope of the redaction of
government information [has been] astounding., 8 The ISOO's official figures
indicate that the federal government classified over fourteen million new
documents in 2003, a nearly sixty-five percent increase over 20Ol and the
largest annual percentage increase for at least a decade. 9 9 In front of a House of
Representatives panel last year, the director of the ISOO said "[i] t is no secret
that [the] government classifies too much information" and called the amount
of overclassification "disturbingly increasing.""'0 Scores of critics have charged
the Bush Administration with obsessive, excessive secrecy and have argued,
like Professor Geoffrey Stone, that "one cannot escape the inference that the
cloak of secrecy imposed by the Bush administration has 'less to do with the

9s.

Memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, to
Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
bush/who 3 19 o2.html.

96. JOINT SEC. COMM'N, REDEFINING SECURITY: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
THE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ch.

2 (1994),

http://www.fas.org/sgp/ibrary/jsc;

see also Scott Shane, Since 2001, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the
Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A1 4 (noting that "vague tags" like sensitive-butunclassified "lack clear rules or definitions," leading one Republican congressional aide to
call such categories "bogus").
97. Pub. L. No. 104-231, 11o Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).

98. John Podesta, Need To Know: Governing in Secret, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 220, 223 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds.,
2003).
99.

INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 38, at 19-20 (reporting combined classification

activity); see also Shane, supra note 96 (describing how "the declassification process ... has
slowed to a relative crawl, from a high of 204 million pages in 1997 to just 28 million pages
last year" and how "[t] he secrecy wave has reached obscure outposts of federal power" like
the Mine Safety and Health Administration).
1oo.

4.Q

Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Lauds Introduction of Comyn-Leahy 'Open Government Act'
(Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=17485
&c= io8.
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war on terrorism' than with its desire 'to insulate executive action from public
scrutiny."""'
In addition to these moves by the Executive to increase information
safeguarding and secrecy, Congress has narrowed FOIA in significant ways.
Placing limits for the first time on who may submit a FOIA request," 2 the 2003
Intelligence Authorization Act amended FOLA to preclude intelligence agencies
from disclosing records in response to any request made by a foreign
government entity, either directly or through a representative.1°3 More
controversially, Congress has been enacting legislation that limits disclosure
through Exemption 3's incorporation of withholding statutes. °4 Section 214 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, for instance, exempts from FOIA "critical
infrastructure information" that is voluntarily submitted to the federal
government for homeland security purposes.1 °5 As with sensitive but
unclassified information, critics have argued that critical infrastructure
information is an overly vague and capacious category whose exemption from
FOIA will allow the government to withhold records unrelated to national
security.1° 6 "Congress also has enacted legislation," the DOJ's FOIA guide
observes, "evidently aimed at achieving an 'Exemption 3 effect' in an indirect
fashion-i.e., by limiting the funds that an agency may expend in responding
to a FOIA request."" 7 Finally, Congress has enacted new regulations allowing
the NSA, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency to exempt their "operational files" from FOIA in the same
manner as the CIA does.' °8

1o1.

GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 557 (2004) (quoting with

approval Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances: DiscardingBedrock Constitutional
Principles,in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS, supra note 99, at 74, 91); see also Editorial, The
Dangerous Comfort of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 2005, at _Ao (criticizing the Bush

Administration's "addiction to secrecy" and suggesting that its main purpose in increasing
classification is "cloaking nonlethal cases of mismanagement and bureaucratic
embarrassment").
1o.
103.

DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 19.
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-3o6, § 312, 116 Stat.
2383, 2390-91 (2002) (codified at S U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (E) (Supp. II 2002)).

104. DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 230 & n.18 (providing examples).
105. Pub. L. No.

107-296, § 214, 116 Stat. 2135, 2152-55 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(A)

(Supp. II 2002)).
106. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, "National Security" Information and the Freedom of Information

Act, S6 ADMIN. L. REv. 1195, 1214 (2004); Bradley Pack, Note, FO!A Frustration:Access to
Government Records Under the Bush Administration, 46 ARIZ.L. REV. 815, 826-27 (2004).
107. DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 231.
io8. See id.
at 233 & nn.34-39 (providing citations).
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B. Mosaic-Making and InformationalParanoia
As the mosaic theory has risen to prominence in the Bush Administration's
paradigm shift away from public disclosure, the theory itself has not changed;
rather, the national security landscape has changed, and the theory has taken
on new salience as a result. The dangers of adversarial mosaic-making were
brutally underscored by the 9/11 attacks, as "[i]t is widely believed.., that the
public criminal trials of the men who attempted to blow up the World Trade
Centers in 1993 made available information about government techniques for
monitoring terrorists, as well as critical information about what it would take
to actually bring the towers down."' Conversely, the attacks also highlighted
our government's failure at defensive mosaic-making, at "connecting the dots"
that would have predicted the hijackings.11 Shifting the mosaic-making
advantage back to the federal government will not be easy, however. The
government now generates and manages more information than ever before,
and is increasingly doing so in digital form, which permits users to process,
share, and disseminate the data more easily. The Internet provides a ready
medium for adversaries to locate and transfer this information, while datamining technologies, becoming more powerful and accessible over time, can
help them extract useful knowledge from otherwise unwieldily large or
complex data sets."' Under FOIA, agencies must provide documents in "any
form or format requested" that is "readily reproducible," including electronic

lo9. CRAIG
(2003).
11o.

L.

See, e.g.,
ANALYSIS

LAMAY, DEMOCRATIC ENTERPRISE: SUSTAINING MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY 6

MARY DERosA, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, DATA MINING AND DATA
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 5 (2OO4), available at http://www.csis.org/media/

csis/pubs/o4o3oldata-mining-report.pdf ("Even in hindsight, we can see no single source
...that could have provided the full or even a large part of the picture of what was being
planned [for 9/11]. We have seen a number of dues, however, that if recognized, combined,
and analyzed might have given us enough to track down the terrorists and stop their
plan."); Donald F. Kettl, UnconnectedDots, GOVERNING, Apr. 2004, at 14 ("In the awful first

months following the 9/11 attacks, there was constant talk about a need to 'connect the
dots."'). To facilitate and institutionalize counterterrorism dot-connecting-which DeRosa
stresses has become more crucial since the end of the Cold War, when we relied "on finding
a relatively few rich sources of intelligence," DEROSA, supra, at 5-President Bush founded
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, now subsumed under the National
Counterterrorism Center. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Strengthening
2003),
available at
(Feb.
14,
America
To Better Protect
Intelligence
http ://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2oo3/o2/2oo3o214-1.html.
mn.See DEROSA, supra note 1io, at 3. DeRosa focuses on the use of data-mining for
counterterrorism, but would-be terrorists could likewise exploit data-mining tools, both to
generate otherwise invisible mosaics and, at a minimum, to lower their search costs.

Acn
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formats." 2 Courts have not directly considered whether the mosaic theory
becomes more significant when applied to electronic records, but the Supreme
Court has acknowledged in discussing personal privacy that, because the value
of information increases with the facility with which one can use it, computer
compilations pose special dangers." 3
More broadly, in the post-9/i1 national security landscape, intelligence
gathering and analysis have become perhaps our most important strategic
assets, 4 while critical infrastructure data has become a key liability;"'
communications and computer technologies have increased the volume,
accessibility, and manipulability of sensitive knowledge and enabled more
sophisticated scheming;" 6 new types of adversaries - more dispersed, harder to
identify, and possibly more ruthless than their predecessors -have
proliferated; and the specter of another attack on U.S. soil has framed political
debate and dictated policymaking. Federal agencies are being pressed to
expand information-sharing with each other," 7 but to reduce informationsharing with the public." 8 All of these developments have served to vitalize the
role of information in national security strategy. That role, however, is
characterized by uncertainty: As information implicating national security has
become more heterogeneous and more abundant, we increasingly do not know
what information matters, or who has it, or how to control it. As the Director
of the University of Maryland's Center for Information Policy has observed,
"there are thousands of nodes of information in the United States and each

112.
113.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B) (2000).
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-64
(1989).

114.

See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 30 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf ("Intelligence-

and how we use it- is our first line of defense against terrorists and the threat posed by
hostile states.").
115.

116.

117.

See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 2002) (exempting critical infrastructure
information from FOIA).
See, e.g., Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Frontin the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use of
the Internet, 5 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 5 (2004) (describing terrorists' Intemet-based
scheming).
See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. lo8-458,
§ lo16, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. 5 4 85 (b)(i)(A), (b)(2)(F) (West
2oo5)) (tasking the President with creating an "information sharing environment" that
"facilitates the sharing of information at and across all levels of security").

118. See supra Section II.A.
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does not know what it does not know or what it needs to know."119 More than
ever, mosaics usable for terrorism and counterterrorism abound. Seen in this
light, the narrowing of FOIA and the expanding role of the mosaic theory
become, normative judgments aside, more understandable.
C. Deference, Delegation,Abdication, and the UnravelingofMosaic Theory
Jurisprudence
With the mosaic theory and FOIA growing in strategic significance for the
government since 9/11, courts have had to assess federal agencies' mosaic
claims over broad, at times extraordinary acts of secrecy undertaken in the
name of national security. In the post-9/11 cases summarized below, three

modes of judicial review emerge. In the first, apparent in holdings by the D.C.
federal courts, judges treat mosaic claims as a distinct, and privileged, defense
of secrecy. Because they see mosaic arguments as especially difficult to evaluate
and mosaic risks as especially frightening in the post-9/11 world, these judges
are especially reluctant to challenge agency opinion when confronted with
mosaic claims: These judges treat mosaic claims with an augmented form of
deference, which amounts to an effective delegation of mosaic theory oversight
to the agencies themselves. The Third Circuit has gone even further, treating
mosaic claims not merely with extra deference, but with complete deference.
Echoing Marchetti's call for "avoidance of judicial review of secrecy
the Third Circuit has countenanced an abdication of mosaic
classifications,"'
theory review. In contradistinction to this approach, a third set of courts has
opposed the application of any special treatment to mosaic claims. Instead,
these courts aim to evaluate mosaic claims like any other, with the standard
deference accorded the government in national security litigation."'

11g. Lee S. Strickland, The Information Shortcomings of 9/11, INFO. MGMT. J., Nov./Dec. 2004, at
34, 40.
12o.
1.

Acl

United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4 th Cir. 1972).
See supra Subsection I.A.2 (describing standard deference under FOIA). I employ these three
categories -deference, delegation, and abdication-not to specify a rigorous taxonomy of
judicial review, but to capture the basic distinctions in the degree and type of deference
courts have granted mosaic arguments. When reviewing any such argument, a court can
grant the government the usual FOIA deference, total deference, or something in between.
(To grant the government no deference or minimal deference would violate explicit
congressional instruction, a long line of precedent, and deeply held norms of national
security litigation.) Delegation occupies that space in the deference spectrum between
standard deference and abdication, so that even though delegation can be seen as
representing a qualitatively distinctive modality of judicial review, no bright line separates it
from the other two categories.
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To help clarify what is distinctive about deference, delegation, and
abdication, they can be conceptualized, like judicial deference under FOIA
review more generally, along three main axes: (1) "support," the extent to
which the court requires evidence to back up government arguments; (2)
"specificity," the extent to which the court requires the government to tailor its
arguments to the specific withholdings; and (3) "plausibility," the extent to
which the court requires clear or convincing showings of potential harm. On
each axis, delegation rates lower than deference: 12 2 Relative to the typical
national security FOIA case, delegating courts are more willing to credit
government arguments unsupported in the record, to allow the government to
use the same argument across multiple records or classes of cases, and to accept
as reasonable less persuasive showings of potential harm. They ask less of the
government, and interpose less of their own reasoning. Abdication represents
the logical endpoint of such delegation: no review whatsoever. Yet even
without the abdication of mosaic theory oversight-which only the Third
Circuit has explicitly endorsed- the effect of delegation is to pare down judicial
review, already deferential in national security matters, closer to judicial
acquiescence, and to insulate all but the most outrageous mosaic arguments
from scrutiny.
Delegation of mosaic claims is at once traditional and new. It is traditional
because, as Part I showed, ever since the canonical triad of Marchetti, Halkin,
and Halperin, courts have accorded the mosaic theory special deference, finding
for the government in nearly every instance. Indeed, the idea that mosaic
claims are worthy of special judicial deference arose concomitantly in case law
with the mosaic theory itself. With the accretion of precedent, the mosaic trope
came to assume a talismanic quality in national security jurisprudence,
threatening the skeptical judge with unknown vulnerabilities, unknown evils.
Halkin and Halperin typify this paranoiac posture and the low-support, lowspecificity, low-plausibility mosaic claims that have succeeded in courts for
decades.'23 What is new about delegation after 9/11 is therefore not the method
or philosophy of judicial review, but the withholdings to which it has been
applied. In line with the narrowing of FOIA and expansion of government
secrecy, the withholdings validated in the recent mosaic theory cases have been

122.

123.

I do not mean to imply that these axes will yield precise quantification. They are presented,
rather, to help illuminate the salient indicia of deference in this context.
See supra Section I.B. This is not to say that every court evaluating mosaic claims from
Halperin to 9/11 applied delegation, nor to deny that deference and delegation may shade

into each other or that courts may be less than transparent in their reasoning. The point
here is that delegation started as and has remained the dominant approach to mosaic theory
review.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

115: 628

2005

more speculative, more categorical, and more controversial than the
withholdings validated before the attacks. Permitting the theory's blanket
application across hundreds of individuals and records with minimal
evidentiary basis, post-9/11 delegation courts have sanctioned a greatly
enlarged role for the mosaic theory in controlling information.
The D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit, the most important lower
courts for FOIA law,' 4 have proven among the staunchest defenders of
delegation after 9/11. A good example was provided by the District Court in
ACLU v. U.S. Department of Justice,"2 s a case pitting the mosaic theory against
public attempts to learn about the government's domestic prosecution of its
War on terror. In ACLU, plaintiffs sued the DOJ under FOIA seeking
information on the FBI's use of section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, a provision
that significantly expands the powers of the FBI under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) to order "the production of any tangible things" for
investigations relating to international terrorism or intelligence.126 The
plaintiffs wanted to learn only the total number of section 215 FISA
applications placed by the FBI, and did not seek access to the applications'
dates, disposition, or content. Even still, the government invoked Exemption 1
and the mosaic theory to deny their request, reasoning that if the number of
FISAs which have been requested "were coupled with the number of FISAs
which have been authorized (a statistic which is publicly available), and the
number of cases opened/closed per year, a database could be built with relative
ease which would reveal a detailed road map of how the FBI conducts its
7
investigations."1
With this argument, the government strained the meaning of "detailed":
Such a road map, however constructed, would not be so detailed as to have
directions, because the plaintiffs were not seeking locations of the requesting
offices, or indeed to have any substantive content, because the plaintiffs were
not seeking information about the requests. But despite the narrowness of the
plaintiffs' FOIA request and the "widespread and exceptional media interest in

124.

See supra note 27. I discuss the D.C. Circuit in the following Subsection.

125. 321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004).

126.

127.

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat.
272, 287-88 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. S 1861 (Supp. II 2002)).
Supplemental Declaration of David M. Hardy at 6, ACLU, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (No. 03-CV02522). The "road map" in Hardy's argument substitutes for the more common mosaic
metaphor. Hardy goes on to explicitly invoke mosaic terminology and precedent later in his
declaration. Id. at 7.
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which there exist possible questions about the government's integrity, '' 2s the
court found for the government. "While the resolution of this issue [was]
hardly free from doubt,"1 9 the opinion confesses, and while mosaic arguments
"may cast too wide a net,"' 30 the court upheld the government's nondisclosure
out of deference to the Executive and to mosaic theory precedent. 3 ' The
government thus prevailed on a mosaic claim with little support, specificity, or
plausibility. Taken along with other recent holdings, ACLU evinces how the
D.C. District Court-which hears more FOIA appeals than any other court'32has remained wedded to delegation in the face of increasingly attenuated
mosaic claims.'33

128. 321 F. Supp. 2d

at 31-32.

i29. Id. at 35.
130. Id. at 37.
131.

Id.

See supra note 27.
133. As controversially, the D.C. District Court upheld the government's mosaic theory
arguments in Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47-49, 59 (D.D.C. 2003), and Edmonds v.
U.S. Department of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2004), to deny an FBI
whistleblower information necessary to prosecute her wrongful termination suit. See, e.g.,
Clay Risen, 'Nuff Said, NEW REPUBLIC, June 7 & 14, 2004, at 12 (casting the government's
mosaic arguments as specious and its classification of Edmonds-related documents as an
attempt to cover up FBI failures). However, it is hard to categorize the Edmonds decisions,
both of which included in camera document review, as examples of either deference or
delegation because the opinions divulge only generic information about the government's
claims and the records withheld.
Less politically charged, Aftergood v. CIA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D.D.C. 2005), offers a
clearer example of delegation. In Aftergood, the D.C. District Court relied on the mosaic
theory in granting summary judgment under FOIA Exemption 3 to the Director of Central
Intelligence's (DCI) withholding of intelligence budget information from 1947 through
1970. Despite the apparently harmless public disclosure of 1997 and 1998 budget figures, the
Acting DCI argued that release of the 1947-1970 figures, "[w]hen coupled with other
clandestinely obtained information, and when viewed from a perspective spanning many
decades," would enable foreign intelligence services "to draw the clearest and most cogent
picture of U.S. intelligence activities, priorities, vulnerabilities, and strengths." Declaration
of John E. McLaughlin at para. 20, Aftergood, 355 F. Supp. 2d 557 (No. 01-2524), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/947/mclaughlin.pdf. Though historically illuminating, how
this picture, composed only of aggregated budgetary data over twenty-five years old, might
threaten national security today was never explained. Compare id., with Patrick S. Roberts,
"Withering on the Vine" Yet Not Uprooted: Reputation and Autonomy in the CIA and FBI
9 (May 5, 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with
author) (noting that all of the government-appointed commissions to study the CIA in
recent decades, including the 9/11 Commission, "agreed that more historical intelligence
budget data should be released to the public, while some studies advocated complete
disclosure"). In another recent case involving old records, the Bush Administration
successfully invoked the mosaic theory in the Eastern District of California to help deny the
132.
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Juxtaposing ACLU with another PATRIOT Act opinion just issued
underscores the difference between delegation and deference. In Gerstein v.
U.S. Department ofJustice, a reporter sued to enforce his FOIA request seeking
summary statistics on the DOJ's use of section 213 of the PATRIOT Act, a
"controversial, high-profile component of the [War on terror]" that permits
courts to issue search and seizure warrants without immediately notifying the
warrant's target."M To protect a six-page compilation indicating the number of
times each U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) had used section 213, the DOJ
asserted the mosaic theory under FOIA Exemption 7(E), which allows agencies
to withhold records whose release "would disclose techniques and procedures
for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose
guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure
could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law."' 3 To "'reveal a
statistical distribution [of section 213 usage] by particular USAO,"' the DOJ
claimed, "could allow criminals 'to direct [their] efforts to a disclosed weakness
' 6
and avoid a disclosed strength in the national law enforcement system. 13
Noting that the government's "sole support for its parade of horribles [was
this] conclusory assertion," the District Court for the Northern District of
California -though it upheld the government's Exemption 7 (C) privacy claim
''
in spite of prior DOJ disclosures137-rejected its 7(E) claim as "dubious. 131
Among other deficits in the government's reasoning, Judge Ronald Whyte's
opinion noted that "the fact that a certain USAO has yet to use Section 213 is
hardly a reliable indicator that it will continue not to do so;" 39 "the [section
213] 'procedure' here is a matter of common knowledge; 1 40 and the attorney
whose declaration explicated the government's mosaic claim "has no special
expertise in criminology or criminal psychology."' 4' With this commonsensical
National Security Archive's FOIA request for selected Presidential Daily Briefs from the
Lyndon Johnson presidency, even though these briefs were over thirty years old and a
number of similar briefs had already been released without incident. Berman v. CIA, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 1209, 1217-18 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

134. No. C-o3-o4893, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) (order granting in part and denying

in part cross-motions for partial summary judgment, denying in part motion to strike, and
denying motion for a more definite statement).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 5 52(b)( 7)( 3) (2000).
136. Gerstein, slip op. at 19 (quoting the government's declaration) (second alteration in
original).
137.

Id. at 16-17.

138. Id. at 20.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Id. at 21.
141

1 _L

Id. at 20.
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analysis (and dismissive language), the court made a mockery of the identical
"road map" logic that had prevailed in ACLU; such conclusory mosaic claims,
Gerstein protests, lack sufficient support, specificity, or plausibility to prevail
under FOIA. In so holding, the Gerstein court became the third district court to
apply deference and reject a mosaic claim involving a controversial PATRIOT
142
Act provision.
Thus, while a number of post-9/11 courts have, like the D.C. District Court
in ACLU, continued to apply delegation even if they have grappled more

142.

Gerstein was, however, the first FOIA case to do so. Like the Detroit Free Press and North
Jersey Media cases discussed infra Subsection II.D.2, these two other PATRIOT Act cases
featured constitutional challenges and were therefore subject to greater weighting of the
public interests opposed to secrecy. In Doe v. Ashcroft, the government argued that mosaic
theory risks justified the preclusion of judicial review of a PATRIOT Act provision
expanding FBI authority to compel communications firms, through the issuance of
"national security letters," to produce customer records deemed relevant to an internationalterrorism- or intelligence-related investigation. 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(construing 18 U.S.C. § 27 09 (b)(2) (Supp. I 2OOl)), appealfiled sub nom. Gonzales v. Doe,
No. 05-0570 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2005). Although this mosaic argument persuaded the district
court that "the Government should be accorded a due measure of deference when it asserts
that secrecy is necessary for national security purposes in a particular situation involving
particular persons at a particular time," here, by contrast, the government sought to
"universally apply these general principles to impose perpetual secrecy upon an entire
category of future cases whose details are unknown." Id. at 524. Unsatisfied with this
preemptive abandonment of support and specificity, the court demanded a "more targeted
and precise" approach. Id. (quoting Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F. 3d 681, 693 (6th
Cir. 2002)).

With Doe v. Ashcroft on appeal at the Second Circuit, the FBI demanded customer
records from a member of the American Library Association under § 2709, and warned the
institution not to disclose to anyone that the Bureau had sought or obtained the
information. The institution challenged this gag as an unlawful prior restraint on speech in
the District Court for the District of Connecticut, and the government rebutted with a vague
mosaic theory: Although the institution's identity "may appear innocuous by itself," the
government asserted, "it could still be significant to a terrorist organization when combined
with other information available to it." Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 77 (D. Conn.)
(granting preliminary injunction), stay granted pending appeal 126 S. Ct. 1 (2005); see also
Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at Ai (describing the
latest developments in this case and revealing that, despite intense opposition from civil
libertarians and some politicians, " [t ] he FBI now issues more than 30,ooo national security
letters a year, . . . a hundredfold increase over historic norms"). After expressing doubts
about the mosaic theory's applicability in this non-FOIA context, Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d
at 77-78, the court held that, regardless, "the defendants' conclusory statements that the
mosaic argument is applicable here, absent supporting facts, would not suffice to support a
judicial finding to that effect," id. at 78. The court further noted that when it asked the
government counsel at oral argument if he could confirm that there was, in fact, a mosaic in
this case that might threaten the FBI's investigation, he "did not do so." Id. In addition to
lacking support and specificity, the opinion suggested by recounting this anecdote that the
government's mosaic argument did not even appear plausible to its own lawyers.
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openly with its costs and benefits, deference has emerged as a viable alternative
and so fractured mosaic theory jurisprudence. In holdings by the Sixth Circuit
and several district courts and in a notable dissent on the D.C. Circuit, judges
like Ronald Whyte have accepted the mosaic theory's general validity, but
rejected its unsubstantiated, unpersuasive, or categorical application. Their
review is meant to be meaningful, though not too searching, as these judges
accord agencies' mosaic theory claims, like all national security claims,
43
substantial weight -standard deference still means deference.'
D. OpposingModalities ofJudicialReview: Two Case Studies
1. Center for National Security Studies
In Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice'
(CNSS), a landmark post-9/ll mosaic theory case, public interest groups
brought a FOIA suit against 'the DOJ to compel disclosure of information
about persons detained in the wake of the attacks, including their names, their
attorneys' names, dates of arrest and release, locations of arrest and detention,
and reasons for detention. After the D.C. District Court had ordered release of
the detainees' and attorneys' names but permitted the DOJ to withhold the
other records under Exemption 7 (A),4' the D.C. Circuit reversed in part,
allowing the DOJ to withhold all requested information under the
mosaic theory.
The district court had found the government's reliance on the mosaic
theory to withhold the names "misplaced" because "there is simply no existing
precedent applying the mosaic theory to Exemption 7" and "application of the

143.

144.
145.

Hence, even though the government has lost in several of the deference rulings I describe, a
court's application of deference to a mosaic claim by no means ensures a plaintiff victory; to
the contrary, the government retains the advantage. Examples of post-9/i1 FOIA cases in
which the court applied deference and upheld an agency's mosaic claim include Coastal
Delivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Service, 272 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964-66 (C.D. Cal. 2003), and
Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center v. National Security Agency, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1342 &
n.7 (S.D. Fla. 2005). In both cases the court, through independent analysis, validated
reasonably well-supported, specific, plausible mosaic arguments-even though the threats
they represented appeared neither obvious nor severe. Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35
(D.D.C. 2003), may also provide an example of the government winning under deference,
but the opinion reveals too little to permit strong conclusions. See supra note 133.
331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002), aftd in
partand rev'd in part, 331 F. 3 d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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mosaic theory would essentially turn 7A into an exemption dragnet." 14 6 The
district court also found it troubling that the "key Government affidavit on the
mosaic theory was not even prepared for this case, but rather [was] a copy of
the affidavit prepared for an unrelated case filed in the Eastern District of
Michigan,"147 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft.14' At oral argument before the
district court, the first question from the judges and much of the discussion
concerned the theory. 149 Counsel for plaintiffs argued that the mosaic theory
advocated by the government could authorize "the secret jailing of unlimited
numbers... on immigration violations as long as the government asserts that
it is done in connection with the terrorism investigation." ' In their appellate
brief, the plaintiffs further noted that, as opposed to most previous mosaic
theory cases, the information at issue here was not classified and had in fact
been provided to the detainees themselves and to their lawyers, who had been
free to disclose it however they wished."'1
Nevertheless, in finding for the government, the D.C. Circuit forcefully
endorsed its mosaic theory arguments and the need for judicial deference. After
noting that "America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes,
with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore,"'5 2 the court
paraphrased the mosaic theory concerns outlined in the government's Detroit
Free Press declaration, that "[a] complete list of names informing terrorists of
every suspect detained by the government at any point during the September i
investigation" might "allow terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation
and more easily formulate or revise counter-efforts."" 3 Citing Sims and
Halperin as mosaic theory precedent,' s4 the court went on to propound that
"[i]t is not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments

146.

147.

Id. at 103. Interestingly, in contemporaneous cases the D.C. District Court did not seem
concerned about turning Exemptions i or 3 into dragnets. See supra notes 125-133 and
accompanying text.
215 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002). This was the district court precursor of DetroitFree
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F. 3 d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), discussed in the following Subsection.
Transcript of Motions Hearing at 8, Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (No. Ol2500), availableat http://www.cnss.org/oralargument.htm.

148. 195
149.

iSo. Id. at 83-84.
isi. Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 25-26, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-5254 & 02-5300), available at
http://www.cnss.org/Final%2oBrief.pdf.
152. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
153. Id. (paraphrasing Declaration of Dale L. Watson at 4-5, Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d
937 (No. 02-70339), availableat http://www.cnss.org/watsonaffidavit.pdf).
154. Id. at 928-29.
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made in furtherance of that branch's proper role [protecting national
security]."'"
In its unwillingness to second-guess the Executive-a brazenly ahistorical
stance given that Congress explicitly instructed courts to do so in FOIA
reviewS 6 -the D.C. Circuit ignored both the great public interest in the
propriety of the detentions as well as, it seems, the dictates of common sense.
For, as the Washington Post's anicus brief stressed, the government "ha[d] not
advanced any reason to believe that Al Qaeda-unlike any other rebellious
faction in history-is so cunning that it can build a [dangerous] 'mosaic' from
simple names of detainees, or that it is so inept that it doesn't even know when
significant people have been detained."' The government had not denied,
moreover, "that many, if not most of the detainees neither [were] terrorists nor
[had] any knowledge concerning terrorism.' ' 8 CNSS's blanket no-disclosure
holding therefore vindicated an extreme application of the mosaic theory:
Through the court's delegation, the government prevailed on a mosaic claim
with low plausibility, very little support, and even less specificity. Essentially,
the court ruled that because the plaintiffs requested too much information -all
of the detainees' names and records - they were not entitled to any
information, 5 9 lest disclosure enable adversarial mosaic-making.
In a scorching dissent, Judge David Tatel accused the majority's delegation
approach of "drastically diminish[ing], if not eliminat[ing], the judiciary's role
in FOLA cases that implicate national-security interests.1 6' For Tatel, the
mosaic scenario at the heart of the government's defense provided too
speculative a basis for FOIA exemption:
The only argument that could conceivably support withholding
innocent detainees' names is the assertion that disclosure of the names

Id. at 932. Highlighting this passage, Professor Cass Sunstein recently identified the CNSS
ruling as a prime exemplar of "national security fundamentalism," the position that "when
national security is genuinely threatened, the president must be permitted to do whatever
needs to be done to protect the United States." Cass R. Sunstein, Monkey Wrench, LEGAL
AFF., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 37, 37.
156. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
157. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Washington Post Company et al. in Support of PlaintiffsAppellees/Cross-Appellants at 24, Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F. 3 d 918 (Nos. 02-5254 & 025300), available at http ://www.cnss.org/cnss%2oamicus%2obrief/2ofinal.pdf.
155.

158.

Id.

159. Brief Amici Curiae for The Washington Post Company et al. in Support of Petitioners on
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (No.
03-472), available at http://www.cnss.org/Media%2oCert%2oAmicus%2oBrief.pdf.

16o. Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F. 3 d at 951 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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"may reveal details about the focus and scope of the investigation and
thereby allow terrorists to counteract it." That [the government]
believes these harms may result from disclosure is hardly surprisinganything is possible."'
Tatel called instead for deference, a "more particularized approach" under
which the government would, as in an ordinary FOIA case, have to "describe,
for each detainee or reasonably defined category of6 detainees, on what basis it
may withhold their names and other information.1 2
With so much argument devoted to the mosaic theory, the CNSS opinions
offer the most complete articulation on record of the advantages and
disadvantages of delegating mosaic claims, and signal the emergence of the
theory as a governing framework in which to assess post-9/11 security threats.
The majority-dissent dialectic, furthermore, neatly frames the debate over the
judiciary's proper role in regulating the War on terror. As one commentator
has argued, CNSS "is an immensely significant case because it indicates a shift
toward greater judicial deference regarding FOLA requests with the post-9/1
emphasis on homeland security." 6, Whether or not CNSS ultimately proves a
signpost toward greater deference, its opinions indicate the deep divisiveness
such a shift would engender, with battle lines drawn around the mosaic theory.
2.

North Jersey Media and Detroit Free Press

Paralleling the majority-dissent divide in CNSS, the companion cases North
Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft 6' and Detroit Free Press v. Ashcrof, 65 in the
Third and Sixth Circuits respectively, likewise turned on the mosaic theory and
its use by the government to insulate 9/11-related measures from judicial and
public scrutiny. The Third Circuit applied delegation of the most extreme kind,
abdication, and found for the government; the Sixth Circuit applied deference
and found for the plaintiffs. With the Supreme Court denying certiorari in
North Jersey Media, the disharmony between its holding and Detroit Free Press's
epitomizes the way in which mosaic theory doctrine, in stasis for two decades,

161.

Id. at 942 (quoting Declaration of James Reynolds at para. 16, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice,

215

F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C.

2002)

(No. o-25oo),

http://www.cnss.org/dojreynoldsdeclaration.htm (emphasis added by Tatel)).
16z. Id. at 951.
163.

Anderson, supra note 6, at 1628.

164. 3o8 F. 3 d 198 (3 d Cir. 2002).
165. 303 F. 3 d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
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has become newly unsettled as a result of the Bush Administration's aggressive
use of the theory.
In these cases, consortia of media groups sought access to "special interest"
deportation hearings involving people whom the Attorney General had
determined might have connections to or knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
Although deportation hearings have long been open proceedings, a September
21, 2001 directive issued by Michael Creppy, the Chief U.S. Immigration
Judge, closed off these special interest hearings to the public and the press.'6 6
To justify this unprecedented move, the government turned to the mosaic
theory: With public hearings, the information presented "could allow terrorist
organizations to alter their patterns of activity to find the most effective means
of evading detection," while "[i]nformation that is not presented at the
hearings also might provide important clues to terrorists, because it could
' 16 7
reveal what the investigation has not yet discovered,'
Faced with the same mosaic theory arguments, the circuit courts reached
opposite conclusions. In North Jersey Media, although the Third Circuit
acknowledged that the plaintiffs "are undoubtedly correct that the
[government's mosaic arguments] are to some degree speculative," it held that
"given judges' relative lack of expertise regarding national security and their
inability to see the mosaic, we should not entrust to them the decision whether an
isolated fact is sensitive enough to warrant closure. '' 168 For the Third Circuit,

166. Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigration
Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://news.findlaw.conv
hdocs/docs/aclu/creppyo921olmemo.pdf.
167. Brief for Appellants at 48, Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681 (No.

02-1437) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Within a year of the Creppy directive, the DOJ also advanced mosaic theory
justifications in the preambles of two related regulations enabling greater court control of
information about immigration detainees. See Protective Orders in Immigration
Administrative Proceedings, 8 C.F.R. S 1003.46 (2004); Release of Information Regarding
Immigration and Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 8 C.F.R. §§
236, 241 (2004). The Department of Transportation, in the preambles to two new
regulations restricting the access of persons denied airmen certificates for national security
reasons to information about their denials, similarly invoked the mosaic theory. See Threat
Assessments Regarding Alien Holders of, and Applicants for, FAA Certificates, 49 C.F.R. §
1540.117 (2004); Threat Assessments Regarding Citizens of the United States Who Hold or
Apply for FAA Certificates, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.115 (2004).
168. 308 F.3d at 219 (emphasis added) (paraphrasing with approval the government's
argument). Judges, in this view, cannot "see" the mosaic even after the government has
described it for them. Cf THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999) ("Unfortunately, no one can be
told what the Matrix is. You have to see it for yourself."). Judge Scirica's North Jersey Media
dissent also found mosaic concerns significant, but would have allowed immigration judges
to make determinations on whether a given special interest deportation hearing should be
closed. 308 F.3d at 227-28 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
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like the Fourth Circuit in Marchetti,169 mosaic theory considerations did not
merely make judicial review of special interest cases more complicated; they
made judicial review inappropriate.
In Detroit Free Press, by contrast, the Sixth Circuit, after conceding the
general validity of the mosaic theory and the Executive's superior knowledge of
national security threats, nevertheless found the Creppy directive
unconstitutionally "over-inclusive. 17 ° "While the risk of 'mosaic intelligence'
may exist," the court argued, "we do not believe speculation should form the
71
basis for such a drastic restriction of the public's First Amendment rights."
Fearing that the "[g]overnment could use its 'mosaic intelligence' argument as
a justification to close any public hearings completely" and to "operate' in
7'
virtual secrecy in all matters dealing, even remotely, with 'national security, ) 2
the Sixth Circuit echoed Judge Tatel's CNSS dissent in applying deferenceand demanded a more direct showing of potential harm than a generic appeal
to the mosaic theory.
III. EVALUATING MOSAIC CLAIMS: THEORY AND APPLICATION

Having summarized the history and current status of mosaic theory
jurisprudence, I explore in this Part the theoretical, legal, and policy
dimensions of applying the theory under FOIA. Comparing mosaic claims to
ordinary exemption claims, Section A questions the assumption that mosaic
claims are special, and therefore worthy of special forms of judicial review. The
distinctive feature of mosaic claims is not, I contend, that they involve mosaic
analysis or facially innocuous information, but rather the degree to which they
may depend on speculative reasoning by the government. Mosaic theory
doctrine, consequently, has been misconceived from the start.
As discussed above, mosaic-making and information generally have taken
on new salience in national security strategy after 9/11, with today's mosaic
threats both more numerous and more speculative than ever before. 73 In light
of these developments, Section B presents arguments in favor of courts

16q. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
170. 303 F.3d at 708.

17. Id. There is irony in this: Whereas the D.C. Circuit in CNSS found the government's
Watson declaration sufficient to justify secrecy over post-9/11 detentions, here the Sixth
Circuit found the same Watson declaration- which was originally prepared for this case and
simply reproduced for CNSS-insufficient to justify secrecy over post-9/11 deportation
hearings.
172. Id. at 709.
173. See supra Section II.B.
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delegating mosaic claims, while Section C presents counterarguments. Because
it is such an outlier, I do not explicitly address abdication in either Section; as
an extension of delegation, abdication possesses its same merits and demerits,
only in greater proportion. I conclude that, whatever its risk-reducing
potential, delegation (and, by extension, abdication) is legally unjustified and
practically unwise. Rather than review mosaic claims with extra deference, as
courts have traditionally done, courts ought to review these claims with extra
scrutiny and skepticism on account of their susceptibility to misuse. Section D
offers suggestions on how judges can do this in practice.
A. "Mosaic" Claims and "Ordinary"Exemption Claims
For all the mosaic theory's status and import in national security
information law, courts have never set out to analyze it beyond a recitation of
the mosaic (or jigsaw puzzle, or road map) metaphor. Underlying courts'
application of special deference to agencies' mosaic claims, however, is the idea
that there is something special about those claims as compared to other claims
for FOIA exemption. Whereas a typical exemption claim involves only one
piece of information, the standard argument runs, mosaic claims involve
multiple pieces of information interacting with each other in potentially
nonobvious ways; as a result, mosaic claims are more difficult for judges to
evaluate and so demand additional deference. Judges lack the "broad view of
the scene," in Marchetti'sfiguration, to "put the questioned item of information
17
in its proper context."174 They cannot "see the mosaic.'
The simplicity of this argument masks its fundamental errors: assuming
that information (in non-mosaic cases) can be dangerous in and of itself, and
assuming that information relevant to national security comes packaged in
stable, meaningful units. To the contrary, information can become dangerous
only in combination with other information and capabilities, and no clear
boundaries demarcate one "piece" or "item" of information from another. To
illustrate, consider two scenarios. In Case One, an ordinary national security
FOIA case, the disclosure of requested record A poses a national security risk.
In Case Two, a mosaic theory case, requested records B and C pose a risk only
when taken together. What makes A, or B + C, dangerous? For either to create
an actual threat to national security, an adversary must be able to assimilate
this new information into its other information and have the capacity to act on
the end product. Information poses no intrinsic threat, for to be dangerous,

174.

United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 ( 4 th Cir.

175.

N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198,

SZ.

1972).

219 (3 d

Cir. 2002).
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even the recipe for the atomic bomb demands an understanding of what it is,
how to interpret it, and access to the ingredients. For FOIA courts,
consequendy, proper contextualization always matters; courts must always be
mindful, as the current executive order on classification instructs, of additional
"relationship[s] . . . not otherwise revealed in the individual items of
information. ' ,,7 6 To advocate delegation-or, like Marchetti and North Jersey
Media, abdication-in cases where mosaic analysis is necessary is to advocate
delegation in every national security FOIA case.
If risk determination thus depends inescapably on a "broad view" and
"proper context," what makes Cases One and Two different? Because FOIA
recognizes no distinction between complete records and parts of records -the
Act's segregation clause requires that "[a] ny reasonably segregable portion of a
record" be released '77-B + C can always be reconceptualized as D, a single unit
of information (or, conversely, as many smaller units). A, likewise, can be
reconceptualized, and segregated, into any number of alternative
configurations. The essential arbitrariness of defining units of information
under FOIA renders illusory the analytic distinction between Case One and
Case Two, between an ordinary FOIA case and a mosaic one. Only an empty
formalism would, ceteris paribus, justify judges treating Case Two with more
deference than Case One or, ifA = B + C, justify releasing more information in
Case One than in Case Two. Coupled with the insight that every national
security exemption claim is, ultimately, a mosaic claim, this deconstruction
holds arresting implications: Inasmuch as the rush to judicial collapse in the
face of "mosaic" arguments has been predicated on a belief in their uniqueness,
it has lacked any legitimate analytic basis.
However, even though the notion of the mosaic theory as a distinctive class
of exemption claim cannot withstand scrutiny, mosaic arguments may still
differ from each other in meaningful ways - for example, in the degree to
which they encompass information that would not otherwise merit protection,
and in the degree to which they are speculative. The former attribute has
typically determined whether or not an argument receives the mosaic label:
When a relatively high portion of the information claimed exempt would be
independendy unclassifiable, agencies and courts identify the argument as an
application of the mosaic theory. But it is the second attribute, speculativeness,
that most influences the nature of the FOIA judge's task. Assume in a given
case that X represents the government-controlled information requested

176. Exec. Order No. 13,292,

§

1.7(e), 3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A.

§

435

(West 2005).
177.5 U.S.C.

§ 55 2(b) (2ooo); see supra Subsection I.A.i (explaining the segregation

requirement).
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through FOIA, and Y the external information the government fears will be
combined with X to form a dangerous mosaic. Because the government
controls X, it can describe X in detail for the court and, if necessary, present X
for in camera review. The government cannot, by contrast, present Y for
review. Indeed, it may not even be able to describe Y or know what Y is or who
has it. The government must use deductive reasoning, possibly supplemented
by intelligence reports, to convince the court that adversaries could combine
the disputed information X with Y (whatever Y is) in a harmful way. While a
prediction of national security harm from FOA disclosure "will always be
speculative to some extent, in the sense that it describes a potential future harm
rather than an actual past harm, "1178 predictions that depend more on Y are
necessarily more speculative in that they rely more on absent, and perhaps
unknown, information. More precisely, a mosaic claim's speculativeness will
vary inversely with the ratio of X to Y, with the amount of government
knowledge about Y, and with the amount of government knowledge about
adversaries' capacity to access and exploit Y. The lower the percentage of the
posited mosaic for which the government can provide evidentiary support, the
greater the speculativeness, and the greater the judicial deference needed to
sustain the exemption claim.
Since 1995, the prevailing executive order on classification has required for
all classifications that authorities be "able to identify or describe the damage" to
national security that "reasonably could be expected to result" from
disclosure.1 79 Mosaics comprising substantial amounts of extrinsic information,
about which the government does not possess full knowledge, tax both the
government's ability to identify or describe their risk and the integrity of a
reasonableness standard for evaluating the likelihood of damage. As mosaic
claims become more speculative, the national security expertise gap between
the government and the court widens and the task of judicial review becomes
more difficult. And in the wake of 9/11, mosaic threats to national security have
become more speculative, and more alarming, than ever before.
B. Advantages ofDelegation
If today's terrorist threats are characterized by their simultaneous intensity
and uncertainty, judicial reluctance to question mosaic theory claims might be
seen as a rational response. Decisionmaking about information disclosure has

178.

Halperin v. CIA,

629 F.2d 144, 149

179.

Exec. Order No.
(West 2005).

13,292,

(D.C. Cir. 198o).

§ 1.1(a)(4), 3 C.F.R. 196, 196 (2003), reprintedin 5o U.S.CA. § 435
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always been constrained by the practical impossibility of measuring the costs
and benefits of openness versus secrecy. This informational deficit exacerbates
a tension that has always existed in FOIA between the goal of promoting
transparent, accountable government and the imperative not to endanger
national security in the process. Yet because the potential costs of an ill-advised
FOIA disclosure, and the difficulties of evaluating what might constitute an illadvised disclosure, are seen to have increased after 9/11, the balancing calculus
has shifted. Adversarial mosaic-making now seems especially dangerous and
unpredictable. In response, post-9/11 courts applying delegation have upheld
agencies' highly speculative, highly generalized mosaic claims when disclosure
would pose no evident danger; they have demanded little from the agencies in
the way of support, specificity, or plausibility. Delegation errs, more so than
deference, on the side of nondisclosure. In its caution, it instantiates a
conservative vision of information policy, wherein executive agencies, not
courts, should control information, and more control is presumed safer.
For those who advocate utmost judicial deference to the Executive in times
of emergency, and who see the present as such a time, delegation holds obvious
appeal. Lest they compromise the War on terror, decisions like CNSS, North
Jersey Media, and ACLU self-consciously integrate the mosaic theory into, in
the approving words of constitutional scholar John Yoo, "a deferential standard
of scrutiny that provides the political branches with the flexibility to conduct
war successfully." 8 By empowering the Executive with greater control over
information, delegation sacrifices liberty, in the form of governmental
transparency, for the sake of security. As with the shift in power from judiciary
to executive, many accept this tradeoff in a time of emergency. From its
coinage in Marchetti,Halkin, and Halperin,the mosaic theory has been a vehicle
for increasing judicial deference. Now that this heightened deference
accommodates the War on terror, it may- irrespective of the exceptional
mosaic concerns arising after 9/11 - appear particularly prudent and legitimate.
An additional argument for delegation is prudential in a narrower sense: It
economizes on administrative and judicial effort. FOIA requests routinely
encompass thousands of pages of government records. Scouring all requested
records for possible mosaics may consume substantial agency resources,
especially if the agency does not know what information (and information
technologies) adversaries possess. Although courts have traditionally been
sensitive to such administrative burdens,"1 they have demanded that agencies
articulate a reasonably specific justification for each document or section

18o. John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 451
(2003).

181. See, e.g., Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C.
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withheld.18 2 Post- 9 /ll courts applying delegation, by contrast, have allowed
information withholding under generic, categorical descriptions of mosaic
consequences-in CNSS, recall, the government defended its mosaic claims
with the exact declaration it had used in Detroit Free Press, and won. In a few
pages of argument, that declaration swept all information about all detainees
under the mosaic theory, sparing the government the burden of having to
"describe, for each detainee or reasonably defined category of detainees, on
what basis it may withhold their names and other information," as Judge
Tatel's "more particularized approach" would have demanded.'8 ' The D.C.
Circuit was, in turn, spared the burden of having to evaluate such descriptions,
which may have required extensive in camera review. The difference between
deference and delegation is one of degree here, rather than kind; the mosaic
theory deals in aggregates and conjectures and so can always act as a laborsaving device when the government does not control all of the mosaic's
components. Relative to standard deference under FOIA national security
review, however, delegation saves more effort by extracting nearly all
"particularity" from the process of asserting and analyzing mosaic defenses.
C. Problems with Delegation (and Deference)
Even if delegation appears attuned in these ways to the post-9/11 national
security environment, its application raises a set of insoluble legal and policy
problems. (Abdication, again, exacerbates delegation's disadvantages as well as
its advantages.) Legally, delegation threatens FOIA's principles of segregation
and individualized document review; it undermines the Act's allocations of
burdens, if not de novo review itself; and it violates legislative intent.
Practically, delegation permits weak, irrebuttable arguments to justify
nondisclosure; it invites agency opportunism and abuse; it lacks theoretical
limits; it facilitates excessive secrecy; and it impairs the courts' institutional
integrity."4 Speculative mosaic claims may have greater force in today's world,
but their validation comes at a steep price. There is no analytic justification,
moreover, for holding a professed "mosaic" claim to lower standards of
specificity and plausibility than a claim not blessed with the mosaic moniker.

182. See King v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 830 F.2d 210, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
183. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Tatel,
J., dissenting).
184. Although the legal problems addressed in this Section pertain specifically to FOLA,
delegation's policy problems obtain equally in other contexts.
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1. Legal Problems
The effort-saving processual advantages of delegation exacerbate a tension
that has always existed between the mosaic theory and FOIA's text. By blurring
the lines between exempt and nonexempt content, the mosaic theory collides
with FOIA's requirement that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a
record" must be released after appropriate application of any exemptions.SS In
1987, the Third Circuit explicitly confronted this tension in American Friends
Service Committee v. Department of Defense,"' a FOIA case in which plaintiffs
sought disclosure of a series of unclassified Department of Defense technical
reports. In denying the plaintiffs' request, the court reflected: "The doctrine of
segregability suggests that we should order the release of that number of
reports which can be disclosed without the whole picture becoming 'guessable.'
We are most reluctant to determine, however[,] ... what the number of entries
is .. .at which the picture becomes 'guessable. ' ''187 That is, somewhere in
between releasing zero reports and all the reports there lay a tipping point
beyond which a dangerous mosaic would become guessable; the Third Circuit
did not believe that it should risk triggering this revelation, or that it should be
the body to locate the tipping point.
Although the mosaic theory was held in this case and others not to violate
FOIA's segregation requirement,'8 8 some argue that the theory allows agencies
to circumvent the provision because it "requires agencies to classify
information that is harmless when segregated-and, therefore, 'reasonably
segregable'-but potentially damaging to national security interests when
combined with other information.' ', 8, One does not have to accept this
interpretation of "reasonably segregable" to accept that as mosaic claims for
exemption have become more speculative, categorical, and attenuated, they
have become more likely to sweep in records that could have been segregated
and released without a reasonable likelihood of harm.
Applying the segregation doctrine to mosaic claims, courts can still enforce
the usual requirement that a "withholding agency must describe each document
or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it must discuss the

185. 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(b) (2000).
186. 831 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1987).
187. Id. at 445-46.
188. Id.; see also Taylor v. Dep't of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 102-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

139. Lepper, supra note 6, at 397 (evaluating and quoting from section 1.3 (b) of Reagan's
executive order on classification). Ironically, the thousand-plus-page DOJ FOIA guide
discusses the segregation requirement under Exemption i immediately after the mosaic
theory, without comment on their relationship. DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 185-88.
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consequences of disclosing the sought-after information."19 0 This tailoring is
precisely what delegation (and abdication) does not do. In North Jersey Media,
the Third Circuit cites the mosaic theory as grounds for denying any access to
all special interest deportation hearings, while in CNSS, the D.C. Circuit uses
the mosaic theory to deny publication of any information about all sevenhundred-plus people detained after 9/11. These cases did not turn on tipping
points because the government never made arguments specific enough to
enable such analysis. "In both cases," Professor Peter Marguiles notes, "the
government failed to demonstrate the accuracy of its [mosaic] assertion,
relying on a conclusory affidavit from one law enforcement official [in North
Jersey Media] and, in [CNSS], on unsupported assertions at oral argument."' 9 '
Delegation thus saves labor only at the cost of undermining FOIA's principles
of segregation and document-by-document review.
More basically, when courts uphold mosaic claims with minimal scrutiny
they risk undermining FOIA's presumption of disclosure. Since the 1974
amendments, FOIA has placed the burden of sustaining withholding actions
on the agency. 92 However, when judges defer to conclusory warnings about
mosaics, and accept no counterarguments,' 9 the effect is to reverse the
presumption of disclosure. 194 With agency expertise so privileged, the integrity
of de novo review itself begins to unravel. Given that the DOJ has reversed its
own presumption of disclosure in telling agencies it will support all
withholding actions unless they lack a "sound legal basis,"' 5 such uncritical
judicial affirmation of mosaic claims now figures to prove especially damaging
to FOIA's stated allocation of burdens.

19o. King v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987). When in camera review
would involve a substantial number of documents, as is often the case, agencies can meet
their production burden by submitting a "Vaughn index" that itemizes and justifies all
withheld documents (or portions thereoo. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Vaughn indices can mitigate, but do not remove, agencies' descriptive-tailoring
burden. King, 830 F.2d at 223-24.
191.
Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency, Institutional Equity, and
ProcedureAfterSeptember 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 400 (2004).

5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (2000).
193. In the vast majority of FOIA national security cases, courts have credited only the opinions
of the agency classification authority. See infra note 224.
194. Professor David Cole, Corl, supra note 6, at 20, and Professor Susan Akram and Maritza
Karmely, Akram & Karmely, supra note 6, at 652, make a similar point regarding the Bush
Administration's reliance on, and some judges' uncritical application of, the mosaic theory
in immigration proceedings.
195. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
192.
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Courts' delegation of mosaic claims not only diverges from the text of
FOIA, but also, more dramatically, from the intent of Congress. Given that
Congress amended FOA in 1974 specifically to foster substantive review over
national security cases,19 6 it is difficult to reconcile delegation, and its expressly
acquiescent posture, with the Act's legislative history. By authorizing courts to
review appeals de novo and examine withheld documents in camera, the
amendments aimed to fulfill FOIA's underlying goal of "prevent[ing] [review]
197
from becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.
Judicial review of FOJA appeals was explicitly sculpted to safeguard the
principles of democratic self-determination and good government. Today's
mosaic claims may be more difficult to resolve than their predecessors, but8that
does not absolve courts of their responsibility to evaluate their substance.9
2.

Policy Problems

If every national security FOIA case is, at bottom, a mosaic case, then it is
illogical for courts to treat cases differently depending on whether or not the
government has presented its exemption claim as a mosaic scenario; regardless,
the court will have to consider mosaic-making possibilities in assessing the
withholding's reasonableness. Fixating on whether an exemption claim
involves mosaics is, in fact, worse than illogical if it deflects attention from the
relevant aspects of the claim: its support, specificity, and plausibility.199 There
is no good reason why courts should uphold less narrowly tailored, less
persuasive government arguments when the specter of mosaic-making is
raised, no reason why delegation should exist for the specificity and plausibility
axes."' Fixing a deference standard for the support axis, however, is more
complicated, for highly speculative mosaics, composed in large part of

196.

See supra Subsection I.A.i.

197. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 8 (1965).

198. Inadequate judicial review of mosaic theory claims appears especially troubling in the

context of the state secrets privilege, asserted sometimes (but not exclusively) in FOIA
litigation, in that it deprives litigants of their right of access to court. See, e.g., Edmonds v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2004). In state secrets cases, the
mosaic theory, if misused, undermines due process in addition to principles of democratic
self-determination and good government.
igg Sincerity is a fourth relevant aspect, but to a significant extent support, specificity, and
plausibility should proxy for sincerity, which-as suggested by the virtually complete
absence of bad faith findings in Exemption 1 litigation, see supra note 37 and accompanying
text-will often be difficult for courts to assess independently.

•oo. See supraSection II.C (defining axes of deference).
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inaccessible and even unknown information, may indeed pose a threat to
national security, now more than ever.
From a plaintiff's standpoint, the fundamental difficulty with courts
upholding highly speculative mosaic claims under a delegation approach is that
it will often be impossible to falsify or rebut such claims. In its most tentative
formulation, the classic mosaic argument against disclosure runs: An
unidentified adversary might at an unspecified time use this information
alongside other unknown information to help construct a mosaic that will
threaten national security in an unpredictable way. As Professor Jane Kirtley
has commented, such a theory is "impossible to refute... because who can say
with certainty that it's not true?" '' There are infinite possible informational
mosaics that could be constructed from the release of any record, the expected
impact of each one of which has a distinct probability and magnitude.
Evaluating what harms "reasonably could be expected to result" from
disclosure-the legal standard by which judges evaluate the propriety of
classification decisions" 2 - becomes especially problematic in the context of a
theoretical construct so characterized by uncertainty. Given courts' baseline of
deference in national security cases, the predictable result is that they have
rejected only the most fantastical mosaic arguments: Gerstein, handed down in
the fall of 2005, was the first published FOIA opinion to reject an agency's
mosaic argument on its logic (as opposed to procedural deficiencies or
countervailing considerations)." ° ' Amplifying deference for a category of claims
already so insulated from scrutiny seems perverse.
The practical unfalsifiability of highly speculative mosaic claims not only
problematizes judicial review; it also makes the mosaic theory ripe for agency
opportunism and abuse. This is the casuistry, and the slippery slope, lurking in
the background of the mosaic theory- a creative agency can justify almost any
withholding under it. Indeed, anecdotal accounts suggest that executive
officials gravitate to the mosaic theory precisely when they know their case for
withholding documents is weak.2" 4 Intelligence agencies are known to dislike

2o. Adam Liptak et al., After Sept. 11, a Legal Battle on the Limits of Civil Liberty, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug.

4,

at Ai (internal quotation marks omitted).
Order No. 13,292, § 1.1(a)(4), 3 C.F.R. 196, 196 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435
(West 2005); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
2002,

202. Exec.

Gerstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. C-o3-o4893, slip op. at 19-21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2005); see supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text.
2o4. E.g., E-mail from David Vladeck, Former Dir., Publ. Citizen Litig. Group, to David Pozen
(Mar. 25, 2005) (on file with author) ("The government never has to defend the soundness
of its mosaic theory, which of course is why the government gravitate[s] to that theory
above all others.").
203.
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FOIA,2 °s and all government agencies lack incentives for disclosure, yet the
agencies alone control the requested information, making the Act amenable to,
if not destined for, undercompliance in security-related areas. When courts
delegate mosaic theory claims, they create a ready vehicle for opportunistic
withholding.
Even without intentional abuse, the application of delegation creates
dramatic potential for overbreadth -for an "exemption dragnet "2o6 - because it
permits the government to withhold even the most innocuous (and politically
controversial) items of information without specifying how each item might
0 7 The Bush Administration's policy of
facilitate a dangerous mosaic.Y
encouraging the withholding of "sensitive but unclassified information,"
presumably under a mosaic theory rationale, seems to have formalized such a
role for the theory. Suggesting what withholdings under this standard might
look like, the government's argument in ACLU that releasing merely the total
number of section 215 FISAs sought by FBI field offices could reveal "a detailed
road map of how the FBI conducts its investigations," offers a textbook
example of overbreadth.2° s Yet while the Bush Administration, in narrowing
FOIA and promoting the mosaic theory, has generated particularly fierce
accusations of abuse and overbreadth, these problems, like delegation itself,
predate

9/11.209

The ultimate concern underlying all these problems is that special
deference to the mosaic theory will corrode the courts' institutional integrity
and lead to excessive secrecy. Excessive secrecy has direct costs, of course, for
people denied information or detained anonymously without good cause.
These costs may fall disproportionately on certain segments of the population,
such as immigrants after 9/11, and so impair equity values. "10 There are also

205.

See Wald, supra note 17, at 761.

206. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2002).
207. See Turley, supra note 6, at 233 n.lo8; see also Hussain, supra note 6, at 1335 ("[T]he very

nature of the mosaic theory renders it overbroad.").
2o8. Supplemental Declaration of David M. Hardy at 6, ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 321 F.
Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. o 3-CV-o2 5 22); see supra notes 125-131 and accompanying

text.
2og. These problems, moreover, are not confined to Republican administrations. Most notably,
critics charged the Clinton Administration with abusing the mosaic theory, and courts with
allowing the abuse, in Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434 (D. Nev. 1995), in which the
government relied on the theory to withhold all information concerning its activities near a
classified, but well-known area purported to harbor hazardous waste. Richard Leiby, Secrets
Under the Sun, WASH. POST, July 20, 1997, at Fi; Turley, supra note 6, at 232-36.
2io. See Margulies, supra note 191, at 400-01 & nn.87-88 (arguing that excessive judicial

deference in CNSS and North Jersey Media offended equity and integrity).
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indirect social costs of government secrecy-ranging from reducing
accountability, to hindering technological progress, to degrading public debate,
to breeding paranoia-which, while they do not capture attention like the
possibility of inadvertently tipping off a terrorist, are just as real. Disclosure of
security-related information, furthermore, does not necessarily increase risk,
but may reduce it by alerting the public to threats and enabling betterinformed responses: As a theoretical matter, it is unclear whether publicizing
vulnerabilities makes them more or less likely to be exploited. 1 Because FOIA
courts consider only the threatening mosaics presented to them by withholding
agencies, the exclusively sinister connotations the mosaic metaphor has
acquired"' thus mask the substantive neutrality of the theory as well as the
pervasiveness, even banality, of mosaic-making activity. 13 Historical
experience 14 and research on humans' cognitive limitations and biases,"'5
moreover, suggest that terrorist threats are particularly likely to trigger
excessive secrecy and general over-response. For reasons such as these, FOLA
set out to overcome the federal government's long-nurtured aversion to
openness and "pierce the veil of administrative secrecy." ,6 Inasmuch as
delegation-by precluding evidentiary counterargument, by inviting abuse and
overbreadth in the classification process, and by minimizing substantive
oversight- generates or facilitates excessive secrecy, it imposes costs on us all.

211.

See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 6o, 8o (1998); James
A. Goldston et al., Comment, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished PublicAccess to Information, 21
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409,451 (1986).

212. In the national security context, I have only seen the mosaic metaphor applied to

adversaries' behavior (offensive mosaic-making), never to the public's or the government's
(defensive mosaic-making), even though legions of commentators have used comparable
metaphors like "connect-the-dots" or "fusion" in describing counterterrorism. See supra note
no. While the sinister coloration of the mosaic metaphor surely has a complex etymology,
the oft-repeated Halkin quotation, see supranote i and accompanying text, must have played
a part.
213. At a micro level, the banality and pervasiveness of the mosaic theory are predicated on the
fundamental role mosaic-making plays in how humans process and construct meaning out
of information. See, e.g., JEROME S. BRUNER, BEYOND THE INFORMATION GIVEN: STUDIES IN
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWING (1973);

JAMES HARTLEY, LEARNING AND STUDYING: A

RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 18 (1998) ("Learning results from inferences, expectations and
making connections.").
214. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215 (2003) (arguing
that national crises consistently provoke civil liberties restrictions that Americans later come
to regret).
2iS. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and ProbabilityNeglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121
(2003); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties To Reduce
Terrorism Risks, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 99 (2003).
216. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Unlike its susceptibility to abuse and overbreadth, however, inadequate
judicial review is not an inherent feature of the mosaic theory. To the contrary,
these inherent features make judicial review of mosaic claims especially
important. The irony is that the same speculative quality of the theory that
makes it so attractive for agencies to misuse is the reason why courts have
increased their deference to agencies relying on it. At the same time, then, that
the mosaic theory threatens to stimulate excessive governmental secrecy, the
additional demands it places on judges undermine their ability and willingness
to confront that secrecy.
D. PracticalSolutions
As the theory is both sensible and wildly exploitable by agencies, there are
no easy answers for courts evaluating (highly speculative) mosaic arguments.
Courts already have tools, however, to mitigate the theory's excesses. Most
fundamentally, courts can force withholding agencies to articulate with as
much specificity and support as possible the mosaic harms they anticipate from
disclosure. Mosaic metaphors may provide a useful heuristic for
conceptualizing adversaries' behavior, but without adequate specificity and
support they should not be cognizable arguments under FOIA, and without
adequate plausibility they should not win. Even though a single mosaic claim
may legitimately encompass a range of documents, some or all of which are
innocuous in their own right, courts can-with the use of in camera review if
necessary (and possible) - still enforce FOIA's segregation requirement by
demanding justifications for each document or portion thereof withheld.'1
When such justifications are valid, courts should allow withholding and
thereby avoid triggering an analytic tipping point.2"' When, by contrast, the
withholding agency cannot identify specific mosaic-making scenarios
reasonably likely to result and describe how they would threaten national
security, courts should, following the executive order on classification, 1 9 force
disclosure." This is, essentially, standard deference under FOIA: the "more

See supra notes 185-191 and accompanying text. If multiple documents share the same
function in the posited mosaic, the agency could describe this through a Vaughn index, as in
any FOIA case.
218. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
219. Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.1(a)(4), 3 C.F.R1 196, 196 (2003), reprinted in So U.S.CA. 5 435
(West 2oo5); see supra note 179 and accompanying text.
2o. Because any piece of information may contribute to infinite possible mosaics, each with a
distinct probability and magnitude, it would be impossible for reviewing courts to survey
the entire mosaic landscape. But they do not have to: They need only consider the mosaics
217.
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particularized approach" intended by Congress in its 1974 amendments, called
for by Judge Tatel in his CNSS dissent, and applied by courts in Gerstein and
(outside of FOIA) in Detroit Free Press. Rejecting categorical assertions and
gross speculation as bases for withholding, this approach aims to align judicial
review of mosaic claims as closely as possible with review of claims not framed
in mosaic terms.
As discussed in Section III.A above, standard deference becomes most
problematic when faced with a highly speculative mosaic claim, in which a
high portion of the posited mosaic consists of inaccessible and possibly
unknown information. At what point does a mosaic become too speculative to
provide a reasonable basis for withholding information? Practically and
theoretically, there can be no fixed answer to this question: Some very
speculative mosaic claims would protect against real threats to national
security, while others would deny the public valuable yet harmless
information. As a rule of thumb, though, the more speculative a mosaic claim
is and the more independently innocuous information it covers, the more
skeptical should be the court's review, given the greater risks of abuse and
overbreadth and given agencies' predilection for turning to the mosaic theory
when they know their case for withholding is tenuous." Such skepticism,
evident in Muniz v. Meeset' and Gerstein," 3 would help counterbalance the
expertise gaps that mosaic claims magnify and the opportunism they invite.
Gauging the plausibility of mosaic claims will never be an exact science, but by
cabining them with reasonable requirements of proof and by matching
speculativeness with skepticism, courts can at least weed out the most spurious
assertions.

221.

presented to them by the parties, who have the information and incentive to alert the court
to all relevant ones. Government agencies have typically presented one mosaic claim per
case; it is conceivable, though, that an agency could present multiple different mosaics, with
an explanation of and risk assessment for each. So long as at least one of these mosaics
meets the standards for exemption, withholding would be appropriate. More problematic
would be a case in which none of the proffered mosaic claims meets the minimal standards
for exemption, but taken together -their magnitude-times-probability sum aggregated in
some way-the threat posed by all the mosaics appears nontrivial. In such a scenario, I
would favor disclosure. FOIA's bar for meeting the national security exemption is already
low: Agencies' arguments need not be convincing so much as plausible. See supra Subsection
I.A.2. Allowing agencies to aggregate mosaic claims in this way would eviscerate FOIA's
already minimalist plausibility constraint, and it would invite opportunism by encouraging
agencies to make as many different mosaic claims as possible, no matter how weak.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.

222.

115 F.R.D. 63, 65 & n.7 (D.D.C. 1987); see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.

223.

Gerstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, slip op. at

19-21

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005); see supra notes

134-142 and accompanying text.
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Courts should, moreover, consider positive mosaic scenarios as well as
negative ones-the public too can mosaic-make, and thereby respond more
intelligently to threats. If FOIA disclosures inform a community of its critical
infrastructure vulnerabilities, for example, its residents may be able to devise
better protection schemes and lobby for their implementation (or, if still
unsatisfied, to relocate). Plaintiffs should have the opportunity to present such
positive scenarios and to rebut the government's mosaic claims.' Likewise,
courts should consider not only the ways in which information technologies
can facilitate adversarial mosaic-making, but also the ways in which they can
help combat such activity. Data-mining technologies may allow agencies to
search their own records more easily and more powerfully for possible mosaics,
reducing their compliance burden as well as enabling more precise arguments
about how threatening mosaics could be constructed. If the information in
dispute is being requested in electronic form, courts may want to consider
releasing only hard copies or encrypted versions rather than denying all
disclosure out of mosaic theory concerns.
The above suggestions operate within the current framework of FOLA
review." 5 A somewhat more radical measure could further invigorate judicial
oversight of mosaic claims: allowing courts to utilize extrajudicial assistants
such as special masters when confronted with difficult mosaic arguments."6
While Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, Patricia Wald observed that "judges
often feel inadequate or incompetent to address either the factual predicates or
the policy judgments involved in executive claims of national security.""

Plaintiffs have traditionally not had this opportunity in FOIA national security appeals.
FOIA courts have accorded "little or no weight to opinions of persons other than the agency
classification authority when reviewing the propriety of agency classification
determinations." DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 153. Some scholars have argued,
unsuccessfully, that FOIA courts should weigh the public interest in disclosure against the
risk to national security. See, e.g., MOYNIHAN, supra note 211, at 217; Halstuk, supra note 36,
at 132. I am not taking up that issue here, but am, rather, proposing a different type of
balancing: Instead of weighing other public interests, such as democratic accountability,
against increased national security risk from disclosure, I am advocating that FOIA courts
weigh the expected (mosaic-based) reduction in national security risk against the expected
increase from disclosure. The balancing calculus remains one of national security alone.
225. While FOIA itself could also be amended to clarify that mosaic claims should receive no
special treatment, President Clinton already made essentially this clarification in his
executive order on classification, and no courts seemed to find the provision helpful or even
relevant. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
226. In at least one FOIA Exemption i case, a district court appointed a special master to review
and categorize a large volume of classified records. Wash. Post v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 766
F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991). For a thoughtful discussion of the costs and benefits of
employing such special masters in FOIA litigation, see Deyling, supra note 6, at 1o5-11.
227. Wald, supra note 17, at 76o.
224.
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Judges also fear being responsible, and seen as responsible, for putting the
country at risk. ' 8 Highly speculative mosaic claims, being both particularly
difficult to evaluate and particularly susceptible to abuse, exaggerate a judge's
dilemma. At the least, extrajudicial assistants could help with fact finding.
More significantly, assistants with backgrounds in national security-for
instance, intelligence agency retirees or officials on rotation, granted immunity
and perhaps even anonymity-could help judges evaluate the plausibility of
posited mosaics. 9 Even if courts continue to weight agencies' risk assessments
above all other viewpoints, the existence of any special mechanism for dealing
with mosaic claims might remind them that the theory is a likely vehicle for
excessive secrecy, and that secrecy has real costs.
CONCLUSION

For all the problems it generates, the mosaic theory, already entrenched
through executive order, agency regulation, and judicial precedent, will remain
a fixture in national security law. As it should. The theory's basic premise is
valid, if simple: Informational synergy does exist, and adversaries can capitalize
on it to our detriment. Indeed, the only way adversaries can capitalize on
information disclosure is through mosaic-making. As the Department of
Justice noted in its CNSS brief, the mosaic theory "is principally an exercise of
21
common sense." 230 The attacks of September ii brutally affirmed the theory
and highlighted its increased valence in an age of information technology and
nonconventional terrorism. Litigation arising out of the government's response
to the attacks, meanwhile, highlighted the theory's pliability in justifying
official secrecy across a great range of activities.
This expanding role for the mosaic theory, and the continued willingness
of some courts to delegate agencies' mosaic claims, should give us pause. With
mosaic decisions still coming down apace and government secrecy still on the

228.

See Halstuk, supra note 36, at 131. Halstuk recommends a more radical measure than special
assistants to invigorate FOIA review: a special Article III court, composed of federal judges
with intelligence bona fides, for national security cases. Id. at 131-32. Halstuk's judges would
have their own special masters. Id. at 132.

a29. Extrajudicial assistants would be especially valuable in this respect if provided access to
government classifiers' work. Yet given the absence of independent expert opinion in FOIA
national security litigation, see supra note 224, extrajudicial assistants should improve the
quality of decisionmaking with or without such access.
23o.

231.

_-

Brief for Appellant at 33, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-5254), availableat http://www.cnss.org/CNSSbrief-final.pdf.
See supra notes lO9-1o and accompanying text.
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rise, the stakes of mosaic theory jurisprudence are higher than ever. While
judicial review in FOIA national security litigation has often been perfunctory,
courts applying standard deference have at least helped check governmental
abuse by demanding plausible arguments tailored to the specific documents
withheld. The recent delegation and abdication cases, by contrast, stand for the
proposition that mosaic risks are beyond courts' ken; that categorical mosaic
assertions can justify unprecedented acts of government secrecy; that judges
should reject mosaic-based withholdings only when patently incredible. Highly
speculative mosaic claims will always provide a challenge to a reviewing court,
but delegation exacerbates the theory's potential for misuse. It is hard to see in
delegation much more than courts' "acquiescence,"232 or to reconcile it with
FOIA's text and purpose. It is hard to miss in North Jersey Media's abdication
approach the acquiescence; the opinion flaunts it. Rather than have courts
reward more speculative, more categorical, more extreme mosaic claims with
additional deference, I advocate various tools for modulating mosaic theory
review to conform as closely as possible to standard FOIA review. Most of
these suggestions are tactical and would require from judges only vigilance.
More radically, I also recommend the use of extrajudicial assistants such as
special masters for difficult mosaic cases.
In over thirty years of the theory's existence, only one FOLA court on record
has rejected a government agency's mosaic defense. In theory, highly
speculative mosaic claims are unfalsifiable; in practice, they have proven
unimpeachable. That a model of reviewing them so undertheorized and so
prone to misuse has, with minimal resistance, risen to such stature in national
security information law is, I submit, remarkable. Heightened deference for
mosaic claims may seem the safe move post-9/11, but courts should not forget
mosaic-making's ubiquity-or such deference's own dangers. Maybe more
than vigilance is required.

232.

Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 331 F. 3 d 918, 940 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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